基于关键时点高管股权激励与盈余管理关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-24 00:32

本文选题：股权激励 + 应计盈余管理　；参考：《吉林大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：为了解决两权分离带来的委托-代理、信息不对称等问题,国内外纷纷实施股权激励作为长期激励的手段,实施股权激励的效果并不是都是正面的,由于股权激励计划达到业绩条件后为管理层带来的丰厚利益,盈余管理操纵行为横行,造成了财务丑闻相继爆发,本文针对股权激励实施过程中的不足提出建议,希望最大程度的发挥股权激励的正面作用,有效抑制负面作用的影响。本文通过对以往研究的总结,发现以往学者忽视了实施股权激励公司在多个关键时点股权激励与盈余管理之间的关系研究,本文希望通过多时点多维度对两者之间关系进行研究,结合相关委托代理理论、人力资本理论、契约理论、信息不对称理论、利益趋同效益和机会主义行为效应理论基础,综合三个关键时点和两个研究方面:从业绩考核期前和业绩考核期内两种盈余管理特征、两个关键时点影响我国实施股权激励的公司盈余管理因素,对股权激励与盈余管理关系进行多方面研究,运用文献搜索法、演绎推理法、定性与定相结合三种研究方法,通过对数据的搜集整理采用描述性统计、Pearson相关性分析、多元线性回归等实证研究方法检验本文假设,形成最终结论:管理层会在基准期前一年进行负向真实盈余管理,计划实施中进行正向的真实盈余管理;相对于等待期/禁售期年度,股权激励公告基准期年度的真实盈余管理更加显著;股权激励的三个关键时点应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理均呈正向联动关系;在股权激励公告公布当年,业绩考核条件实现的难易程度与应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理均呈显著正相关关系,在度过等待期/禁售期当年,业绩考核条件实现的难易程度与应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理呈正相关关系,但关系均不显著;相比较股权激励计划度过等待期/禁售期,股权激励计划公告基准期的盈余管理受到股权激励有效期、业绩考核标准、股权激励模式、股权激励人数的影响更大,在后文通过稳健性检验再次检验了上述的结论。通过三个重要时点的加入,本文在时间维度上更加明确了不同关键时点股权激励与盈余管理的关系,根据实证研究结果,本文针对股权激励实施过程中的不足从上市公司内部治理结构、股权激励方案和业绩考体系、监理规范的经理人市场、外部资本市场的监管四个方面提出对应的建议,希望可以为我国股权激励更加顺利的实施做出一定贡献。
[Abstract]:In order to solve the problems of principal-agent and information asymmetry brought by the separation of two rights, equity incentive has been implemented as a means of long-term incentive at home and abroad, and the effect of equity incentive is not all positive. Due to the rich benefits brought to the management by the equity incentive plan after the achievement of the performance conditions, the manipulation of earnings management is rampant, resulting in financial scandals. This paper puts forward some suggestions for the deficiencies in the implementation process of the equity incentive. Hope to maximize the positive role of equity incentives, effectively inhibit the negative impact. Based on the summary of previous studies, this paper finds that the former scholars ignore the research on the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management at several critical points in the implementation of equity incentive companies. This paper hopes to study the relationship between the two through multi-point and multi-dimension, combined with the related principal-agent theory, human capital theory, contract theory, information asymmetry theory, benefit convergence and opportunistic behavior effect theory foundation. Synthesizing three key time points and two aspects of research: from the two characteristics of earnings management before the performance appraisal period and the performance appraisal period, the two key time points influence the factors of earnings management of the stock right incentive in our country. This paper studies the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management from many aspects, using literature search method, deductive reasoning method, qualitative and definite combination of three research methods, through the collection of data using descriptive statistical Pearson correlation analysis. The empirical research methods such as multiple linear regression test the hypothesis of this paper and come to the final conclusion: the management will carry on the negative real earnings management in the year before the base period and the positive real earnings management in the implementation of the plan; Compared with the waiting period / no-sale period, the real earnings management in the base period of equity incentive announcement is more significant, and the accrual earnings management and the real earnings management are all positively related to each other at the three key points of equity incentive. In the year of the announcement of equity incentive announcement, the degree of difficulty in realizing the performance appraisal conditions was positively correlated with both accrual earnings management and real earnings management. The degree of difficulty in performance appraisal is positively correlated with accrual earnings management and real earnings management, but the relationship is not significant. Earnings management in the base period of the announcement of equity incentive plan is influenced by the validity of equity incentive, performance evaluation standard, equity incentive model and the number of equity incentives. The above conclusions are tested again through the robustness test in the following articles. Through the addition of three important time points, this paper clarifies the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management at different critical time points in time dimension, according to the results of empirical research. This paper puts forward corresponding suggestions from four aspects: internal governance structure of listed company, equity incentive scheme and performance test system, supervision standard manager market, supervision of external capital market. We hope to contribute to the smooth implementation of equity incentive in China.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F272.92

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