独立董事地理距离对公司代理成本的影响

发布时间：2018-04-25 06:04

本文选题：独立董事 + 地理距离　；参考：《中国工业经济》2017年08期

【摘要】：本文通过手工收集2004—2013年中国A股上市公司独立董事的主要工作所在地信息,实证检验了独立董事地理距离对公司代理成本的经验影响关系。本文发现,独立董事地理距离与公司的双重代理成本均呈现显著的U型曲线关系,意味着独立董事距离任职公司太远或太近都不利于其发挥监督职能,这种影响在国有企业和欠发达地区企业中表现得更为明显,说明地理距离对独立董事监督职能的影响会因公司的产权性质和外部的制度环境而存在强弱差异。此外,本文进一步发现独立董事与任职公司间的地理距离越远,其越可能缺席公司的董事会会议,从而提供了地理距离影响独立董事监督职能的直接履职行为证据。本文的研究既丰富了独立董事监督职能影响因素的研究文献,也把关于地理区位特征影响经济主体行为的研究扩展到了独立董事领域,相关研究结论能够帮助投资者和监管机构根据独立董事的地理区位特征更好地识别上市公司代理问题的严重性,也有助于加深理解和科学评价中国独立董事的治理行为及其治理效果。
[Abstract]:This paper empirically examines the empirical relationship between the geographical distance of independent directors and the agency cost of Chinese A-share listed companies by manually collecting the information of the main work location of the independent directors of China A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2013. This paper finds that the geographical distance of independent director and the double agency cost of the company show a significant U-curve relationship, which means that the independent director is too far or too close to the company to perform its supervisory function. This effect is more obvious in state-owned enterprises and enterprises in less developed areas, which indicates that the influence of geographical distance on the supervisory function of independent directors will be different due to the nature of property rights and the external institutional environment of the company. In addition, this paper further finds that the farther the geographical distance between independent directors and serving companies, the more likely they will be absent from the board meetings of the company, thus providing evidence of direct performance of duties that geographical distance affects the supervisory function of independent directors. The research in this paper not only enriches the research literature on the influencing factors of independent directors' supervisory function, but also extends the research on geographical location characteristics to the field of independent directors. Relevant findings can help investors and regulators better identify the severity of agency problems of listed companies according to the geographical location of independent directors. It also helps to understand and scientifically evaluate the governance behavior and its effect of independent directors in China.
【作者单位】：厦门大学管理学院会计系;厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“上市公司聘请社会名人和退休官员担任独立董事的动机与后果”(批准号71572160)
【分类号】：F271;F275

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