技术型独立董事与创新研发投资

发布时间：2018-04-27 14:26

  本文选题：技术型独立董事 + 研发投资不足　； 参考：《南京大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：十三五规划中创新创业仍是重中之重的主题,并颁布了国家科技创新规划,公司的创新研发活动不仅是公司的生产经营、未来发展的核心动力,更是推动国家创新水平高速发展的主心骨。独立董事制度研究也一直是会计及公司治理方面研究居高不下的热点话题。然而RD活动本身的投入多、周期长、回报率不确定等特质以及公司治理中的矛盾决定了管理者往往倾向于削减研发活动投入、选择回报快的投资这样的短视行为,另一方面研发活动时间一般较长、过程复杂且专业,投入和产出并不一定呈线性关系,对其监督难度很大。基于这样的考量,本文认为技术型独董作为董事会中独立第三方的管理者,能够发挥其专业技能和经验,一方面为企业RD活动提供指导,另一方面对RD决策中不科学合理之处加以监督和抑制。本文以2011-2013年上市公司制造业企业为对象,研究技术型独立董事与RD投资不足之间的关系,检验技术型独立董事能否发挥其专业知识技能对管理层进行监督,从而有效抑制RD投资不足的现象。通过实证检验发现,技术型独立董事能够发挥监督职能,有效抑制管理层减少RD投资的行为,并且越年轻的技术型独董对RD投资不足现象的抑制作用越强。实证结果未能证明技术型独董的与工作地是否异地、技术型独董的薪酬水平会显著影响其监督职能,使其抑制RD投资不足现象作用更强。此外,在稳健性检验中对RD投入水平的检验也同样证明了本文观点,认为技术型独董能够给企业的RD活动积极的影响。本文的研究结果能为政府和企业在完善独立董事制度、鼓励创新、提高企业核心竞争力和公司治理水平等方面提供一些参考和建议。
[Abstract]:Innovation and entrepreneurship is still the most important theme in the 13th Five-Year Plan, and the National Science and Technology Innovation Plan was promulgated. The company's innovative R & D activities are not only the core driving force for the company's production and operation, but also for future development. Is to promote the national innovation level of high-speed development of the backbone. Independent director system research has also been a hot topic in accounting and corporate governance. However, the characteristics of R D activity itself, such as large investment, long cycle, uncertain rate of return and contradictions in corporate governance, determine that managers tend to reduce R & D investment and choose short-sighted behavior such as fast return investment. On the other hand, R & D activities generally take a long time, the process is complex and professional, input and output do not necessarily show linear relationship, it is very difficult to supervise the R & D activities. Based on these considerations, this paper argues that technical directors, as managers of independent third parties in the board of directors, can bring their professional skills and experience into full play, on the one hand, to provide guidance for enterprise R D activities. On the other hand, the unscientific and reasonable aspects of Rd decision should be supervised and restrained. Taking the manufacturing enterprises of listed companies in 2011-2013 as the object, this paper studies the relationship between independent directors of technology and insufficient R D investment, and tests whether independent directors of technology type can exert their professional knowledge and skills to supervise the management. In order to effectively curb R D investment insufficient phenomenon. The empirical results show that the independent directors of the technology type can play a supervisory role and effectively restrain the behavior of the management to reduce R D investment, and the younger the technical independent directors are, the stronger the restraining effect is on the phenomenon of insufficient R D investment. The empirical results fail to prove whether the technology independent director is located in a different place, and the salary level of the technology independent director will significantly affect its supervisory function, making it more effective in restraining R D investment insufficiency. In addition, the test of R D input level in the robustness test also proves the viewpoint of this paper, that the technology independent director can positively influence the R D activity of the enterprise. The results of this paper can provide some references and suggestions for the government and enterprises to perfect the independent director system, encourage innovation, improve the core competitiveness of enterprises and corporate governance.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F273.1;F406.7
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本文编号：1811097