基于动态博弈的横向监督与团队激励的关系研究

发布时间：2018-04-29 04:28

本文选题：横向监督 + 动态博弈　；参考：《管理工程学报》2017年02期

【摘要】：基于动态博弈,以激励的动态一致性为切入点研究横向监督与团队激励的关系。首先,以横向监督存在为前提,分析激励动态一致与激励动态不一致两种情形下横向监督的类型与性质,分别得到正向监督与平衡型监督。然后,分别建立无横向监督时激励动态一致的博弈模型与激励动态不一致的博弈模型、存在横向监督时激励动态一致的博弈模型与激励动态不一致的博弈模型,根据得到的均衡解做进一步分析,得出结论:1与无横向监督相比,激励动态一致时产生的正向监督对团队产生了正效应;而激励动态不一致时产生的平衡型监督对团队产生了负效应。2激励动态一致时,员工努力程度及企业总收益会随着横向监督水平的提高而提高;而激励动态不一致时,横向监督水平与棘轮效应越大团队遭受的损失就越大。3 4种情况下的企业总收益排序为:激励动态一致且存在正向监督时、激励动态一致且无横向监督时、激励动态不一致且无横向监督时、激励动态不一致且存在平衡型监督时。因此,为了提高团队绩效,企业需要保证激励动态一致同时争取建立正向监督机制。
[Abstract]:Based on dynamic game, the relationship between horizontal supervision and team motivation is studied from the point of view of dynamic consistency of incentive. Firstly, based on the premise of the existence of horizontal supervision, the types and properties of horizontal supervision under the conditions of dynamic consistency of incentive and inconsistent dynamic of incentive are analyzed, and the positive supervision and balanced supervision are obtained respectively. Then, the game model of dynamic consistency of excitation without lateral supervision and the game model of dynamic inconsistency of incentive are established, and the game model of dynamic consistency of incentive and the game model of dynamic inconsistency of incentive under horizontal supervision are established respectively. Based on further analysis of the obtained equilibrium solution, it is concluded that the positive supervision of the incentive dynamic consistency has a positive effect on the team compared with the one without horizontal supervision. When the incentive dynamic is inconsistent, the balanced supervision has a negative effect on the team. 2. When the incentive dynamic is consistent, the employee's effort level and the enterprise's total income will increase with the increase of the horizontal supervision level, but when the incentive dynamic is not consistent, the employee's degree of effort and the enterprise's total income will increase with the horizontal supervision level. The bigger the horizontal supervision level and ratchet effect, the greater the loss of the team. 3. 3. The total income of the enterprise is ranked as follows: when the incentive dynamic is consistent and there is positive supervision, the incentive dynamic is consistent and the horizontal supervision is not. When the excitation dynamic is inconsistent and there is no horizontal supervision, the incentive dynamic is inconsistent and there is balanced supervision. Therefore, in order to improve team performance, enterprises need to ensure consistent motivation and strive to establish a positive monitoring mechanism.
【作者单位】：东北大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目(71202154,71072122) 中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(N120406006)
【分类号】：F272.92;F224.32

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