盈余管理行为中的经理人惯性——一种基于个人道德角度的解释与实证

发布时间：2018-05-11 18:42

本文选题：盈余管理 + 经理人惯性　；参考：《南开管理评论》2017年03期

【摘要】：公司治理只是外部制度影响的结果,还是同样深受个人内在品性的影响?这在实证研究上是一个较少被检验的问题,本文试图对这一问题进行探索。本文选择曾在两个上市公司担任过高管(董事长或总经理)的个人样本,通过检验两个公司之间操控性应计水平的相关性,考察盈余管理是否会受高管个人特征的影响。本文将这种个人特征阐释为道德品性,并将受其影响的盈余管理行为一致性称为盈余管理中的经理人惯性。实证研究发现,在控制了其他影响因素后,具有相同高管的公司之间盈余管理水平具有显著的正相关关系;且这种盈余管理水平的相关性并非仅仅因为高管先后任职的公司具有相似的财务状况和治理环境。实证结果支持盈余管理受到经理人惯性影响这一推论。该研究结果的启示在于,制度建设是制约盈余管理的必要但非充分条件,在外部制度建设效应边际递减之际,应重视和甄别经理人内化的德行品性,避免过于强调制度,在治理的投入上出现不符合成本效益原则、损害公司价值及利益相关者利益的情形。
[Abstract]:Corporate governance is only the result of external institutional influence, or is it also deeply influenced by the internal character of individuals? This is a less tested problem in empirical research, this paper attempts to explore this problem. This paper selects a personal sample of two listed companies who have served as executive (chairman or general manager), and examines whether earnings management is affected by the personal characteristics of the executives by testing the correlation of the operational accrual level between the two companies. This paper interprets this personal characteristic as moral character and calls the consistency of earnings management behavior influenced by it as the manager's inertia in earnings management. The empirical study shows that after controlling for other influencing factors, there is a significant positive correlation between the earnings management level of companies with the same executives; And the correlation of earnings management level is not only due to the similar financial situation and governance environment. The empirical results support the inference that earnings management is influenced by managers' inertia. The enlightenment of this study is that institutional construction is a necessary but not sufficient condition to restrict earnings management. When the marginal effect of external institutional construction decreases, we should pay attention to and identify the moral character of managers' internalization, and avoid emphasizing the system too much. The investment in governance does not conform to the principle of cost-benefit and damages the value of the company and the interests of stakeholders.
【作者单位】：南京大学商学院会计学系;上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71372032) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(15YJC790137)资助
【分类号】：F272.91

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