国企混合所有制改革与公司现金持有

发布时间：2018-05-14 12:30

本文选题：国企混合所有制改革 + 现金持有　；参考：《石河子大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：信息不对称下的融资约束与代理冲突是影响公司现金持有的关键因素,亦形成了价值“较高观”与“较低观”的现金持有之谜。已有研究大都默认公司股权结构的固定不变,而忽略了股东的进入与退出促使股权结构一直处于动态变化的现实背景。加之系列政策及文件的频繁出台,积极发展国有资本、集体资本及非国有资本等交叉持股、相互融合的混合所有制改革正在深化加快。而相关文献却少有研究国企混合所有制改革(以下简称“国企混改”)对公司现金持有水平的可能影响。基于上述背景,本文以2003-2015年我国沪深A股国有上市公司的平衡面板数据为研究样本,集中探讨了国企混改对公司现金持有水平的作用关系、影响机理及其经济后果。研究发现:(1)股权多样性(前十大股东的类别)与现金持有水平的关系尚不明显,股权分散度(股权多元化程度)及融合度(国有股与非国有股的制衡程度)与现金持有水平正相关,控制权转移与现金持有水平的关系也尚不显著;(2)按行业特征与市场化进程细分发现,股权分散度及融合度与现金持有水平的正相关关系在竞争行业与高市场化进程中尤为凸显。控制权转移在竞争行业与高市场化进程中与现金持有水平呈现明显的负相关关系;(3)机制检验的结果发现,国企混改并未通过融资约束渠道影响公司现金持有水平。股权分散度和融合度主要通过减少超额持现的过度投资(竞争行业与高市场化进程中尤甚)、增加研发投入的治理效应路径促使现金持有水平有所增加(股权多样性并未有效发挥上述作用),而控制权转移在减少国企过度投资(竞争行业与高市场化进程中更强)、增加研发投入的同时还增加了股利支付进而引致现金持有水平也未发生明显变化;(4)经济后果的检验发现,整体而言,股权多样性、分散度及融合度对现金持有竞争效应的提升作用有限(分散度在竞争行业和高市场化进程地区的提升作用有所凸显),控制权转移则强化了现金持有的竞争效应(竞争行业和高市场化进程中尤甚)。股权多样性也未带来现金持有价值的提升,分散度作用有限,而融合度和控制权转移的价值提升作用则较为明显(竞争行业与高市场化进程中更为明显)。本文可能的理论贡献与现实意义在于:(1)基于我国国企深化改革过程中股权结构的动态变化视角来探究其对公司现金持有的可能影响,在揭示国企现金持有背后成因的同时,也丰富和完善了现金持有水平与价值的已有研究;(2)我国国企混改方面的理论研究明显滞后于改革实践。尤其是我国法律法规尚需完善的现实背景下,针对其改革方式与改革绩效,现存争论不休、结论不一。本文则试图从现金持有的微观视角来反观时下我国国企混改及不同的混改方式是否有效提升了企业价值,以揭示我国国企混改现存分歧原因所在的同时,也能为系统全面地评价国企混改的经济后果提供部分经验证据,还能为今后国企混改的不断深化提供部分政策参考和经验借鉴。
[Abstract]:The financing constraint and the agency conflict under information asymmetry are the key factors that affect the company's cash holdings, and they also form the riddle of cash holding of "higher outlook" and "lower view". Most of the existing research has defaults on the fixed ownership structure of the company, but neglects the entry and exit of shareholders to make the ownership structure change dynamically. With the frequent introduction of the series of policies and documents, the cross ownership of state-owned capital, collective capital and non state capital is actively developed, and the mixed ownership reform is deepening. Based on the above background, this paper takes the balance panel data of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A share listed companies as the research samples for 2003-2015 years, concentrates on the relationship between the state-owned enterprises' cash holding level, the influence mechanism and its economic consequences. (1) the (1) equity diversity (the category of the top ten shareholders) and the present The relationship between the ownership level and the degree of ownership diversification (equity diversification) and the degree of balance between the state-owned shares and non state stocks is positively related to the level of cash holdings, and the relationship between the transfer of control rights and the level of cash holding is not yet significant; (2) it is found that the degree of ownership dispersion and degree of convergence and degree of convergence are divided according to the industrial characteristics and marketization process. The positive correlation of cash holding level is particularly prominent in the competition industry and the process of high marketization. The transfer of control rights has a significant negative correlation with the level of cash holding in the competition industry and the high market process. (3) the result of the mechanism test found that the state-owned enterprise mixed reform did not pass through the financing constraint channels to influence the company's cash holding level. The degree of ownership dispersion and convergence is mainly through the reduction of overinvested overinvestment (especially in the process of competitive industry and high marketization). Increasing the governance effect path of R & D investment increases the level of cash holdings (equity diversity does not play the role of the above), and the control right is transferred to reduce excessive investment in state-owned enterprises (competition industry). In the process of high marketization, the increase of R & D investment also increased the dividend payment and the level of cash holding did not change obviously. (4) the test of economic consequences found that, on the whole, the share diversity, dispersion and degree of convergence have limited promotion effect on the competition effect of cash holding (dispersion degree in the competition industry and higher) The role of control transfer strengthens the competitive effect of cash holding (especially in the competition industry and the process of high marketization). The diversity of equity has not brought about the promotion of the value of cash holdings, and the decentralization is limited, while the value of convergence and the transfer of control rights are more obvious (competition). The possible theoretical contributions and practical significance of this paper are as follows: (1) based on the dynamic change of the ownership structure in the process of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, the possible influence on the cash holdings of the company is explored, and the reasons behind the cash holdings of state-owned enterprises are revealed, and the cash holdings are enriched and perfected. The research on the level and value of our country; (2) the theoretical research of China's state-owned enterprises' mixed reform is obviously lagging behind the reform practice. In particular, under the realistic background that the laws and regulations of our country still need to be perfected, the existing debate and conclusion are different in view of the reform mode and the performance of the reform. This article tries to look back on the current China from the micro perspective of cash holdings. Whether the enterprise mixed reform and the different mixing methods have effectively promoted the enterprise value, in order to reveal the reasons of the existing differences in the state-owned enterprises' mixed reform in China, can also provide some empirical evidence for the systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the economic consequences of the state-owned enterprises' mixed reform, and also provide some policy reference and experience for the continuous deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises in the future.

【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F276.1;F275

【参考文献】