基于用户质量的平台企业定价及竞争策略研究

发布时间：2018-05-15 01:19

本文选题：平台企业 + 双边市场　；参考：《江苏大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着互联网信息技术的飞速发展,企业平台化的经济趋势已经势不可挡。从门户网站(谷歌、雅虎、腾讯、百度等)、购物平台(淘宝、京东等)、出行旅游平台(携程、艺龙等)到第三方电子支付平台(支付宝、微信支付、PayPal等)、视频网站(爱奇艺、优酷等)等平台企业不断涌现,平台企业间的竞争日益激烈。如何在激烈的市场竞争环境中获得生存并建立竞争优势成为平台面临的一大难题。其中,用户规模作为平台成功的关键一直为学界与业界所重视,如何在短时间内快速“引爆”用户规模成为平台管理者的运营目标。但是,片面追求平台用户规模的增长极易使平台用户良莠不齐,出现用户质量问题,而用户质量水平关乎平台声誉,是决定平台成败的另一个重要指标。相对而言,国内外关于用户质量对平台定价及竞争策略的影响研究比较匮乏,因此本文在引入用户质量维度的基础上扩展了双边市场理论对平台企业的定价及竞争问题的研究。本文首先分析了我国平台企业的发展现状,指出平台企业在运营及竞争过程中面临的问题,并明确了用户质量对于平台企业可持续发展的重要性。其次,详细介绍了双边市场理论以及交叉网络外部性理论,并针对各因素对平台定价水平及竞争策略的影响进行相关的文献综述。然后,引入用户质量维度,探讨了用户质量对于单一平台定价策略的影响,研究了用户质量对双平台竞争策略的影响,进一步比较分析了异质用户归属性行为对双平台竞争战略问题的影响。最后,对本文的研究成果进行了总结,并给予了相关的政策建议,指出了本研究中的不足之处,展望了双边市场平台企业未来的研究方向。本文研究表明:(1)平台对一方用户的要价与本方及另一方不同质量用户所产生的网络外部性之间相关关系的强弱取决于高质量用户的占比。(2)若任一方高质量用户占比降低,平台应提高对该方的定价水平同时降低对另一方的定价水平,反之则反;提价与降价的幅度取决于质量水平变化一方与对方平均交叉网络外部性强度的比值。(3)在考虑一方用户质量无差异,而另一方用户质量有高有低时,均衡条件下,平台对异质用户方的要价与平台上本方高质量用户比重负相关,并且高质量的异质用户方占比并不必然影响平台对同质用户方的要价。(4)双边市场平台用户归属行为不受限制时,在均衡状态时,一般情况下,两边用户均单平台接入时,平台的收益最高;一边单平台接入一边多平台接入时,平台的收益次高;两边用户均多平台接入时,平台所获得收益最低。对于两边均多归属的情况,高质量用户占比的提高对于平台收益的增加显得尤为重要,并且当平台仅聚集其中一方高质量用户时,更有利于平台利润的提升。根据本文的研究结果,提出了平台应重视用户质量、关注平台企业的排他性行为、提高平台差异化等相关政策建议,为平台的发展提供一定的管理启示。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet information technology, the economic trend of the enterprise platform has a trend which cannot be halted from portal (Google, YAHOO, Baidu, Tencent, etc.), shopping platform (Taobao, Jingdong), travel platform (Ctrip, eLong) to the third party payment platform (Alipay, WeChat to pay, PayPal etc. video website (Iqiyi), and. The competition among platform enterprises is becoming increasingly fierce. How to survive and build competitive advantage in the fierce market competition environment is a big problem facing the platform. Among them, the key to the success of the platform has always been paid attention to by the academia and the industry, and how to "detonate" quickly in a short time. The size of the user is the operating target of the platform manager. However, the growth of the one-sided pursuit of the platform user size is very easy to make the platform users good and bad, and the quality of the users is a problem. The quality level of the user is related to the platform reputation, which is another important indicator to determine the success or failure of the platform. The research on the impact of competition strategy is scarce, so on the basis of introducing the user quality dimension, this paper extends the research on the pricing and competition of the platform enterprises by the bilateral market theory. This paper first analyzes the development status of the platform enterprises in China, points out the problems faced by the platform enterprises in the process of operation and competition, and makes clear the use of them. The importance of the quality of the household to the sustainable development of the platform enterprise. Secondly, it introduces the bilateral market theory and the cross network externality theory in detail, and makes a literature review on the influence of each factor on the platform pricing level and the competition strategy. Then, the user quality dimension is introduced to discuss the pricing of the user's quality to a single platform. The influence of the strategy is studied. The influence of user quality on the dual platform competition strategy is studied, and the influence of the heterogeneous user attribution on the dual platform competition strategy is further compared and analyzed. Finally, the research results of this paper are summarized, and the relevant policy suggestions are given, and the shortcomings in this study are pointed out, and the bilateral cities are prospected. The future research direction of the field platform enterprise. This paper shows that: (1) the relationship between the price of the platform for one party user and the network externality produced by the different quality users of the other party depends on the proportion of the high quality users. (2) the platform should raise the level of the price of the party if the high quality user ratio of any party is reduced. At the same time, the price level of the other party is reduced, and vice versa. The rate of price raising and price reduction depends on the ratio of the quality level to the average cross network externality of the other side. (3) when the quality of one party is not different, while the other party's quality is low, the price of the platform to the heterogeneous user is in equilibrium under equilibrium conditions. The proportion of high quality users on the platform is negatively correlated, and the high quality heterogeneous user occupation ratio does not necessarily affect the price of the platform to the homogeneity user. (4) when the user ownership behavior of the bilateral market platform is not restricted, in the equilibrium state, when both sides are all single platform access, the platform has the highest income; one side of the platform is connected to the platform. When both sides have multiple platform access, the platform gains the lowest income. As for both sides, the improvement of high quality user account is particularly important for the increase of platform revenue, and it is more beneficial to the platform when the platform is only gathering one of the high quality users. According to the results of this paper, it is suggested that the platform should pay attention to the quality of the users, pay attention to the exclusive behavior of the platform enterprises, improve the platform differentiation and other relevant policy suggestions, and provide some management inspiration for the development of the platform.

【学位授予单位】：江苏大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F724.6;F274

【参考文献】