竞争环境下存在规模经济的集团采购供应链协调

发布时间：2018-05-16 22:29

本文选题：集团采购 + 供应链协调　；参考：《中国管理科学》2017年02期

【摘要】：研究两个制造商通过一个集团采购组织(GPO)集中采购某种部件的集团采购问题,并考虑部件价格的数量折扣、各制造商产品的部分替代性。首先构建集中式决策、独立采购两种基准决策模型,分析集团采购的可行条件。然后,构建批发价格契约下的集团采购决策模型,分析规模经济性、竞争强度和部件价值等因素对于均衡结果的影响,并揭示制造商参与集团采购的激励问题。最后提出两种契约协调方案,并考察契约的适用性。研究发现:部件价值越高,竞争越激烈,集团采购越是可行;批发价格契约不仅会降低集团采购价值,还会降低制造商参与集团采购的积极性;收益共享契约只能在部分情形下协调供应链,而"会员费+佣金"的两部收费契约可实现完美供应链协调。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the problem of two manufacturers centralized purchasing a certain part through a group purchasing organization (GPO), and considers the quantity discount of component price and the partial substitution of each manufacturer's product. Firstly, two kinds of benchmark decision models of centralized decision and independent purchasing are constructed, and the feasible conditions of group purchasing are analyzed. Then, the decision model of group purchasing under wholesale price contract is constructed to analyze the influence of economies of scale, competition intensity and component value on the equilibrium results, and to reveal the incentive problem of manufacturers participating in group purchasing. Finally, two contract coordination schemes are proposed, and the applicability of the contract is investigated. It is found that the higher the component value, the more competitive the group purchase is, the more feasible the group purchase is, the lower the group purchase value is, the lower the manufacturer's enthusiasm to participate in group procurement is. The revenue-sharing contract can only coordinate the supply chain in some cases, and the two fee contracts of "membership fee commission" can achieve the perfect supply chain coordination.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;深圳大学管理学院;重庆大学工商管理与经济发展研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272086,71572020) 国家社会科学基金重大项目(15ZDB169) 中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2016M602529)
【分类号】：F274

【相似文献】