创新联盟双元独占的治理研究

发布时间：2018-05-29 01:43

本文选题：双元独占 + 治理机制　；参考：《科学学与科学技术管理》2017年06期

【摘要】：双元独占是研究企业如何既能从现有创新中获利又能从现有创新催生的未来创新中获利的问题,然而,现有文献在联盟层面平衡双元独占冲突问题的治理机制及作用效应方面的研究相对缺乏。从资源基础视角入手,通过对高技术产业207份有效问卷调查,研究不同治理机制对联盟企业的双元独占的作用差异,并考虑联盟类型的调节作用。结果表明,正式治理机制有利于提升联盟企业的原发性独占和生成性独占;非正式治理机制会降低联盟企业的原发性独占,但会提升联盟企业的生成性独占;与规模联盟相比,范围联盟会加强正式治理机制与原发性独占、生成性独占以及非正式治理机制与生成性独占间的正向关系,但它对非正式治理机制与原发性独占间关系的调节作用不显著。
[Abstract]:Dual monopolization is the problem of how enterprises can profit from both the existing innovation and the future innovation generated by the existing innovation. However, There is a lack of research on the governance mechanism and the effect of dual monopolistic conflict at the alliance level. From the perspective of resource base, 207 effective questionnaires of high-tech industry are used to study the different roles of different governance mechanisms on the dual monopolization of alliance enterprises, and to consider the regulating role of alliance type. The results show that the formal governance mechanism can promote the primary monopoly and generative monopoly of the alliance enterprises, while the informal governance mechanism will reduce the primary monopoly of the alliance enterprises, but will enhance the generative monopoly of the alliance enterprises; compared with the scale alliance, the informal governance mechanism will reduce the primary monopoly of the alliance enterprises, but will enhance the generative monopoly of the alliance enterprises. The scope alliance will strengthen the positive relationship between formal governance mechanism and primary monopoly, generative monopoly and informal governance mechanism and generative monopoly, but it does not play a significant role in regulating the relationship between informal governance mechanism and primary monopoly.
【作者单位】：西安理工大学经济与管理学院;山东工商学院工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71372171) 陕西省重点学科建设专项资金项目(107-5X1301) 山东工商学院青年基金项目(2013QN005)
【分类号】：F273.1

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