排他性与非排他性策略下创新授权契约机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-03 16:50

本文选题：(非)排他性选择 + 产品质量创新　；参考：《科技进步与对策》2017年04期

【摘要】：分析了不完全信息下,拥有提高产品质量技术的创新企业,在(非)排他性授权策略下,向进行Cournot竞争生产低质量产品的生产企业技术授权的契约优化问题。研究表明,在排他性授权策略下,双重收费契约下信息不完全能使接受授权生产企业赢取更多的创新企业特许权补贴;在非排他性授权策略下,不完全信息能够削弱创新企业通过双重收费契约设计对产品间接市场的垄断程度。在排他性授权交易下,信息不完全使特许权收费契约优于固定收费契约成为可能,这不同于Li and Wang的研究结论。基于提高社会创新能力视角,政府应鼓励创新企业更多采用特许权收费授权契约,削弱信息不对称的影响,赢取更多研发投资利润回报。
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the contract optimization problem of the technology authorization for the production of low quality products with Cournot competition under the (non-exclusive) licensing strategy of innovative enterprises with improved product quality technology under incomplete information. The research shows that under the exclusive authorization strategy, the information under the double fee contract can not completely make the authorized production enterprises win more concession subsidies for innovative enterprises, and under the non-exclusive authorization strategy, Incomplete information can weaken the monopoly degree of product indirect market by double-fee contract design. Under exclusive authorization transaction, the incomplete information makes it possible that the concession fee contract is superior to the fixed fee contract, which is different from the conclusion of Li and Wang. From the perspective of improving the ability of social innovation, the government should encourage innovation enterprises to adopt more concession fee licensing contracts, to weaken the influence of information asymmetry and to win more profit returns on R & D investment.
【作者单位】：烟台大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402158) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC790185) 山东省社会科学规划研究项目(12CJJZ07,14CJJJ08,15CJJJ27)
【分类号】：F273.1

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