基于敬业理论的生产型员工成本控制契约研究

发布时间：2018-06-04 22:17

本文选题：成本控制 + 契约　；参考：《工业工程与管理》2017年01期

【摘要】：在制造业企业成本控制活动中,管理者和生产型员工间产生了委托代理问题,并由此签订成本控制契约。由于员工敬业行为对其成本控制业绩产生着影响,因而将敬业度引入成本控制契约,研究了员工成本控制能力、努力成本和管理者精神激励成本等变量对员工最优风险分担、敬业度、努力程度和管理者最优收益的影响。研究结果表明:最优风险分担系数和本职最优努力水平、员工成本控制能力呈正相关,与努力成本、风险偏好程度、风险方差呈负相关;最优行为敬业度和最优额外努力水平与员工能力呈正相关,与努力成本、管理者精神激励成本呈负相关;最优总努力水平和管理者最优收益与员工能力、特质敬业度呈正相关,与努力成本、风险偏好程度、风险方差、管理者精神激励成本呈负相关。
[Abstract]:In the cost control activities of manufacturing enterprises, the problem of principal and agent is generated between managers and productive employees, and the cost control contracts are signed. Due to the impact of employee engagement on its cost control performance, it introduces the degree of respect to the cost control contract, and studies the cost control ability of the staff, the effort cost and the manager. The results show that the optimal risk sharing coefficient and the level of the best effort are positively related to the ability of employee cost control, and it has a negative correlation with the effort cost, risk preference and risk variance, and the optimal behavior is respected. The degree and the optimal level of extra effort are positively related to the employee's ability, and have a negative correlation with the cost of effort and the mental incentive cost of the managers. The optimal total effort level and the manager's optimal income are positively related to the employee's ability and the trait respect degree, and have a negative correlation with the effort cost, the risk preference, the wind risk variance and the manager's spiritual incentive cost.
【作者单位】：哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072075) 国家社会科学基金资助项目(16BJY078)
【分类号】：F272.92

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