保兑仓模式下供应链期末返利契约参数设计

发布时间：2018-06-06 13:23

本文选题：资金约束供应链 + 期末返利契约　；参考：《系统科学与数学》2017年03期

【摘要】：以两阶段资金约束型供应链作为研究对象,以零售商运营资金不足作为前提条件,主要研究保兑仓模式下两级供应链期末返利契约的参数设计问题.首先构建了面向资金约束下银行直接贷款时供应链期末返利契约模型,作为模式比较的基础.然后,定量化建立了保兑仓模式下期末返利契约协调模型,该模型以制造商作为供应链的主导企业,承担全部的经营风险.引入银行作为第三方展开融资业务,以制造商信用作为基础,为零售商提供运营资金.应用Stackelberg博弈模型求解出保兑仓模式下银行、制造商、零售商总体利益最大化下最优的订货量、批发价格以及期末增量单位返利数量值.通过运算发现,在保兑仓模式下,制造商的最优批发价小于直接融资模式下的制造商批发价,由于制造商承担全部风险,致使零售商订货量增加,同时制造商利润上升,从而使整个供应链的利润随之上升.
[Abstract]:Taking the two stage capital constrained supply chain as the research object and taking the shortage of operating funds of the retailer as the precondition, this paper mainly studies the parameter design of the final rebate contract of the two level supply chain under the model of the confirmed warehouse. Then, the model of the final rebate contract under the model of the confirmed warehouse is set up quantitatively. The model takes the manufacturer as the leading enterprise of the supply chain and assumes all the operating risks. It introduces the bank as the third party to carry out the financing business, based on the manufacturer's credit, and provides the operating funds for the retailers. The Stackelberg game model is applied to the model. The optimal order quantity, wholesale price and final increment unit rebate value under the overall profit maximization of the bank, manufacturer and retailer under the model of a confirmed warehouse are solved. The optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer is less than the wholesale price in the direct financing model under the model of the confirmed warehouse. The risk will lead to an increase in the order quantity of retailers and the increase of manufacturer profits, thus making the profits of the entire supply chain go up.
【作者单位】：天津大学管理与经济学部;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71271152) 天津市科技发展战略研究计划项目(12LZLZF06000) 天津市哲学社会科学研究规划项目重点项目(TJGL16-010)资助课题
【分类号】：F274

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