基于同事压力与群体规范的团队合作

发布时间：2018-06-17 08:00

本文选题：公平偏好 + 同事压力　；参考：《系统管理学报》2017年02期

【摘要】：通过引入传统自利偏好假设忽略的公平偏好和群体规范,用行为博弈论方法在一个统一框架下,研究了同事压力形成机制、群体规范约束机制以及两者对团队合作的激励作用,并对团队精神培养进行了行为博弈分析。研究结果表明:公平偏好会自发地形成内部同事压力;公平偏好下,即使付出成本也会惩罚搭便车者,从而同事惩罚通过公平偏好会形成外部同事压力;较强的内部同事压力和外部同事压力在合作预期较高的群体规范中都能够唯一实施团队合作;而当公平偏好太弱、实施同事惩罚的成本太高或群体规范的合作预期太低时,搭便车行为将成为主导。这为现实中团队合作和搭便车行为都广泛存在的实证和实验发现提供了理论解释,也为团队精神培养和团队合作激励机制设计提供了决策参考。
[Abstract]:By introducing the fair preference and group norms ignored by the traditional self-interest preference hypothesis and using the behavioral game theory method under a unified framework, this paper studies the coworker stress formation mechanism, the group norm constraint mechanism and the incentive effect of the two to team cooperation. And conduct the behavior game analysis to the team spirit cultivation. The results show that: fair preference will spontaneously form internal peer pressure, under fair preference, even paying the cost will also punish the hitchhiker, so the colleague punishment through fair preference will form external peer pressure; Both internal and external peer pressures were able to implement teamwork only in group norms with higher expectations of cooperation, while when fairness preferences were too weak, the cost of implementing peer punishment was too high or the expectation of cooperation in group norms was too low. Hitchhiking will dominate. This provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical and experimental findings of the widespread existence of team cooperation and hitchhiking in reality, and also provides a decision reference for the cultivation of team spirit and the design of incentive mechanism for team cooperation.
【作者单位】：重庆交通大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102165) 重庆市科学技术项目(KJ110408)
【分类号】：F272.92

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