政府薪酬管制背景下国企高管薪酬契约参照点及业绩敏感性研究

发布时间：2018-06-27 06:27

本文选题：薪酬管制 + 国有企业　；参考：《北京理工大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国的国有企业承担着经济发展和维护社会稳定的责任,不少国企的负责人是具有较高行政级别的公务员,由政府直接行政任命。由于国企高管身份的特殊性,其薪酬一直备受社会各界的关注,这一方面关系到国有企业薪酬制度的有效性,另一方面也反映了社会各界对社会贫富分化和社会公平的关注。近年来,国企高管与普通职工之间的薪酬差距越来越大,为形成高管与普通职工之间的合理工资收入分配关系,合理调节不同行业高管之间的薪酬差距,我国先后出台了《关于进一步规范中央企业负责人薪酬管理的指导意见》、《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》等制度,对国企高管的薪酬进行管制。学术界当前对高管薪酬的研究对高管的绝对薪酬关注较多,但对缔约当事人在薪酬契约订立过程中可能存在的行为心理,如参照点设定和损失厌恶等对签约结果的影响则关注较少。参照点契约理论把契约视为缔约各方在交易关系中判断得失的唯一参照点,为缔约各方交易关系的缔结提供了一种进行利益得失判断的基准。本文基于参照点契约理论,结合我国国有企业薪酬管制的制度背景,以中国A股2009-2014年上市公司为检验样本,选取国有企业同行的薪酬基准(同行高管薪酬的行业均值)为契约参照点,实证检验了我国国有企业高管薪酬的参照点效应及政府薪酬管制政策的影响,为提高国有企业业绩、有效激励高管提供思路,为国家监管部门制定高管薪酬管制政策提供参考。研究发现我国国有企业高管薪酬对同行薪酬基准表现出显著的参照点效应,且这种参照点效应对公司业绩具有促进作用。政府的薪酬管制政策会削弱国有企业高管薪酬对公司业绩、同行薪酬基准的敏感性,但对同行薪酬基准敏感性的削弱十分有限。本文建议国有企业高管薪酬决策者要充分考虑契约当事人决策过程中的行为因素,通过调整高管的薪酬结构提升高管薪酬对公司业绩的敏感性,消除薪酬管制政策的负面影响;政府主管部门要以政府监督为主,充分发挥市场的作用、不断完善国有企业的内部治理机制,才能在激励国有企业高管的同时,有效约束高管的行为,形成国有企业高管与企业职工之间合理的收入分配关系,实现薪酬水平适当、结构合理、管理规范和监督有效。
[Abstract]:The state-owned enterprises of our country bear the responsibility of economic development and maintaining social stability. Many of the responsible persons of state-owned enterprises are civil servants with higher administrative levels appointed directly by the government. Because of the particularity of the executive status of state-owned enterprises, its compensation has been concerned by all walks of life. On the one hand, it is related to the effectiveness of the compensation system of state-owned enterprises, on the other hand, it also reflects the concern of all walks of life about the social polarization between the rich and the poor and the social equity. In recent years, the pay gap between the top executives of state-owned enterprises and ordinary workers has become wider and larger. In order to form a reasonable distribution of wages and income between executives and ordinary workers, the pay gap between executives in different industries can be adjusted rationally. In China, the guidelines on further standardizing the compensation Management of the responsible Persons in Central Enterprises and the Plan for the Reform of the compensation system of the responsible Persons in the Central Management Enterprises have been promulgated successively to regulate the compensation of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. At present, the academic research on executive compensation pays more attention to the absolute compensation of executives, but about the behavior psychology of the contracting parties in the process of making the salary contract. The effect of reference point setting and loss aversion on the signing result is less concerned. The reference point contract theory regards the contract as the only reference point for the parties to judge the gain and loss in the transaction relationship, which provides a basis for the conclusion of the transaction relationship between the contracting parties. Based on the reference point contract theory and the background of the compensation control system of state-owned enterprises in China, this paper takes the A share listed companies of China from 2009-2014 as the test samples. This paper selects the compensation benchmark of the state-owned enterprises (the industry average of the peer executive compensation) as the contract reference point, and empirically tests the reference point effect of the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises and the influence of the government salary control policy, in order to improve the performance of the state-owned enterprises. To provide effective incentives for senior executives to provide ideas for national regulatory departments to formulate executive compensation control policy to provide a reference. It is found that the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises has a significant reference point effect on the peer compensation benchmark and this reference point effect can promote the performance of the company. The government's pay control policy would weaken the sensitivity of executive compensation to corporate performance, peer pay benchmarks, but very little to peer pay benchmarks. This paper suggests that the executive compensation decision makers of state-owned enterprises should fully consider the behavioral factors in the decision-making process of the contract parties, improve the sensitivity of executive compensation to the performance of the company by adjusting the executive compensation structure, and eliminate the negative impact of the salary control policy. The competent government departments should give priority to government supervision, give full play to the role of the market, and constantly improve the internal governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises, in order to encourage the senior executives of state-owned enterprises to effectively restrain their behavior at the same time. To form a reasonable income distribution relationship between the executives of state-owned enterprises and the staff and workers of the enterprises, to realize the appropriate salary level, the reasonable structure, the effective management standard and the supervision.
【学位授予单位】：北京理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F272.92;F276.1

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