总经理变更对公司盈余管理的影响研究
本文选题:总经理变更 + 应计盈余管理 ; 参考:《大连理工大学》2016年硕士论文
【摘要】:在中国上市公司中,高管变更事件时有发生,并带来了诸如人事变动、战略调整以及股价波动等一系列连锁反应。作为高管决策的一部分,盈余管理行为是高层管理者权衡利弊后做出的选择。高管变更对盈余管理的影响问题,一直是学者们研究的热点。总经理作为高层管理团队的核心人物,在制定重大决策时有着举足轻重的地位。但现有研究多集中在总经理变更对应计盈余管理的影响,相比之下,总经理变更与真实盈余管理关系的研究较少,并且在研究不同变更类型对盈余管理的影响差异时,多集中于变更发生前期。基于上述背景,本文选取了中国沪深两市A股的上市公司共11114个观测样本,选取2008-2014年为研究区间,采用OLS回归方法分别研究了总经理变更当期以及变更后第一、二期对应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的影响,进而选取2437个发生总经理变更事件的样本,将变更类型区分为非正常变更和正常变更,检验了不同变更类型对应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的影响程度是否不同。实证结果表明,出于自身发展利益和绩效薪酬的考虑,新任总经理会在上任当期利用应计项目显著调减盈余水平,在上任后的第一、二年会显著调增应计项目盈余。但继任者在上任当年并没有显著的真实盈余操纵迹象,在上任后续年度会进行显著的正向真实活动盈余调整。此外,在非正常变更情形下,继任总经理会在上任当期进行显著的应计项目盈余调减行为,但不会过多地使用不易操纵的真实活动进行盈余管理。针对以上结论,本文提出了有利于资本市场建设的政策建议。一方面,证监会应当要求发生总经理变更的上市公司详细披露盈余信息,对异常盈余水平给出合理解释;另一方面,上市公司应当加强自身管理,尽量保持高管团队构成的稳定性,适当关注继任总经理的心理特征,努力培养与继任高管的长期合作关系,鼓励总经理通过提高公司价值来提升自己的地位,通过制定合理的激励机制来满足总经理的自我实现需要。
[Abstract]:Among listed companies in China, executive changes have occurred from time to time, and have brought about a series of chain reactions, such as personnel changes, strategic adjustments and stock price fluctuations. As a part of executive decision, earnings management is a choice made by senior managers after weighing advantages and disadvantages. The impact of executive change on earnings management has been a hot topic for scholars. As the core of senior management team, general manager plays an important role in making important decisions. However, most of the existing studies focus on the effect of the change of general manager on earnings management. In contrast, the relationship between the change of general manager and the real earnings management is less studied, and the difference of the effect of different types of change on earnings management is also studied. Focus on the early stages of the change. Based on the above background, this paper selects a total of 11114 observation samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China, selects 2008-2014 as the study interval, and uses OLS regression method to study the current period of general manager change and the first one after the change, respectively. The second phase corresponds to the impact of earnings management and real earnings management. Then 2437 samples of general manager changes are selected, and the types of changes are classified as abnormal changes and normal changes. The effects of different change types on accounting earnings management and real earnings management are tested. The empirical results show that due to the consideration of self-development interests and performance compensation, the new general manager will make use of the accrual items significantly to reduce the surplus level in the current period, and increase the accrual earnings significantly in the first and second years after taking office. But the successor has no significant signs of real earnings manipulation in the year he takes office, and will make a significant positive adjustment to real activity earnings in the following year. In addition, in the case of abnormal changes, the successor general manager will carry out significant accrual earnings reduction in the current period of office, but not too much use of difficult to manipulate the real activities for earnings management. In view of the above conclusions, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions in favor of capital market construction. On the one hand, the CSRC should require listed companies whose general managers have changed to disclose earnings information in detail to give a reasonable explanation for the level of abnormal earnings; on the other hand, listed companies should strengthen their own management. To maintain the stability of the top management team, pay due attention to the psychological characteristics of the successor general manager, strive to cultivate long-term cooperative relationship with the successor, encourage the general manager to improve his status by improving the company value. Through the establishment of a reasonable incentive mechanism to meet the needs of the General Manager self-actualization.
【学位授予单位】:大连理工大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2016
【分类号】:F275
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