机构投资者、内部控制与企业非效率投资关系研究

发布时间：2018-07-12 16:44

本文选题：机构投资者 + 内部控制　；参考：《重庆大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：近几十年来,已有大量国内外学者实证研究证实投资与经济增长呈正相关关系。投资效率的高低直接影响经济增长速度,也是各个国家经济实力较量最直接的竞争指标之一。非效率投资(投资不足、过度投资)不仅是阻碍企业长远快速发展的因素之一,并且会严重影响我国经济实力的提升速度。习总书记在第二十二次全面深化改革会议上强调深化投融资体制改革,要确立企业投资主体地位,改善企业投资管理,注重事前政策引导、事后监管约束和过程服务,发挥好政府投资的引导作用和放大效应,整体提高投资效率。基于我国企业非效率投资现象的普遍存在以及国家对投资的高度重视,本研究的重点是如何提高投资效率、改善企业非效率投资状况。本文以我国2009-2013年沪、深两市主板上市公司为研究对象,基于委托代理理论和信息不对称理论,从理论和实证角度考察了机构投资者持股和内部控制两种公司治理机制对企业非效率投资的治理作用,并分别考虑不同类型的机构投资者和企业产权性质的影响。论文主要基于以下四个问题展开:一是机构投资者持股是如何发挥治理企业非效率投资的作用;二是内部控制是如何发挥治理企业非效率投资的作用;三是对于不同产权性质的企业和不同类型的机构投资者,机构投资者持股和内部控制的治理作用是否会因此受到影响;四是机构投资者持股和内部控制对于企业非效率投资能否发挥协同的治理效果。通过模型设计和实证检验,研究发现机构投资者持股和内部控制与企业非效率投资呈显著负相关关系,表明机构投资者持股比例的上升能够加强对经理人的监督,从而抑制企业的非效率投资;内部控制质量的提高能够实施更好的内部监督,缓解企业内外部之间的信息不对称,从而改善企业的投资效率。进一步分组研究发现,相对于国有企业,在非国有企业中机构投资者持股和内部控制对企业非效率投资的抑制作用更加显著;相对于交易型机构投资者,稳定型机构投资者持股加剧了机构投资者持股和内部控制与企业非效率投资之间的负相关关系。为了检验机构投资者持股与内部控制对企业非效率投资是否存在协同治理效应,参照已有学者研究方法,将内部控制分为高质量内部控制和低质量内部控制组进行均值与中位数的差异化检验,同时进行分组回归,结果显示机构投资者持股与内部控制对企业非效率投资存在协同治理效应。本文拓展了企业非效率投资治理机制的研究,丰富了相关文献,并且对解决企业非效率投资问题具有重要的指导和借鉴意义。
[Abstract]:In recent decades, a large number of domestic and foreign scholars have confirmed that there is a positive correlation between investment and economic growth. The level of investment efficiency directly affects the economic growth rate and is also one of the most direct competition indicators of the economic strength of various countries. Inefficient investment (insufficient investment, excessive investment) is not only one of the factors that hinder the long-term rapid development of enterprises, but also will seriously affect the speed of our country's economic strength. At the 22nd conference on comprehensive deepening reform, General Secretary Xi stressed the need to deepen the reform of the investment and financing system, to establish the status of the main body of enterprise investment, to improve enterprise investment management, to pay attention to policy guidance ahead of time, and to supervise and restrain afterwards and serve the process. Give full play to the guiding role and magnifying effect of government investment and improve overall investment efficiency. Based on the widespread phenomenon of inefficient investment in Chinese enterprises and the high attention paid by the state to investment, the focus of this study is how to improve the efficiency of investment and improve the situation of non-efficient investment of enterprises. Based on the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper takes the listed companies on the main boards of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2009-2013 as the research objects. From the theoretical and empirical point of view, this paper examines the governance effects of corporate governance mechanisms such as institutional investors' shareholding and internal control on enterprises' inefficient investment, and considers the effects of different types of institutional investors and enterprise property rights respectively. The thesis is mainly based on the following four problems: first, how institutional investors hold shares to play the role of governance of inefficient investment, second, how to play the role of internal control of the governance of inefficient investment; Third, for the enterprises with different property rights and different types of institutional investors, whether the governance role of institutional investors holding shares and internal control will be affected as a result; The fourth is whether institutional investor stock holding and internal control can exert synergistic governance effect on enterprise inefficiency investment. Through model design and empirical test, it is found that institutional investors' shareholding and internal control have a significant negative correlation with enterprises' inefficient investment, which indicates that the increase of institutional investors' shareholding ratio can strengthen the supervision of managers. The improvement of internal control quality can implement better internal supervision, alleviate the information asymmetry between the internal and external enterprises, and improve the investment efficiency of enterprises. Further grouping study found that institutional investor holding stock and internal control in non-state-owned enterprises have more significant inhibitory effect on non-efficiency investment than state-owned enterprises, compared with transactional institutional investors, The stable institutional investor's holding intensifies the negative correlation between institutional investor's holding and internal control and enterprise's inefficient investment. In order to test whether there is a synergistic governance effect between institutional investors' shareholding and internal control on enterprises' inefficient investment, we refer to the existing research methods. The internal control was divided into high quality internal control group and low quality internal control group. The results show that institutional investors' shareholding and internal control have synergistic governance effects on enterprises' inefficient investment. This paper expands the research on the governance mechanism of enterprises' non-efficient investment, enriches the relevant literature, and has important guidance and reference significance for solving the problem of enterprise's non-efficient investment.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275

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