两类代理成本之于金字塔结构下公司效率的中介作用研究

发布时间：2018-07-20 21:16

【摘要】：根据代理理论,可以将公司治理过程中的代理成本划分为管理层与股东之间的第一类代理成本和大股东与中小股东之间的第二类代理成本。以上述理论为背景,本文研究了两类代理成本在金字塔结构类型影响公司效率的过程中所起到的中介作用。通过对2010-2014年创业板上市公司的数据实证研究发现,金字塔结构的纵向层级、横向跨度均显著降低了两类代理成本,提高了上市公司效率,两类代理成本在金字塔结构的纵向层级和横向跨度影响公司效率的过程中,发挥显著的部分中介作用,且第一类代理成本的中介作用大于第二类代理成本,这与以往关于成熟上市公司金字塔结构的研究结论不同,为确保结果的可靠性,本文进行了稳健性检验。结合创业板实际,从终极控制人利用金字塔结构对公司治理实施支撑行为的角度给出了合理的解释,试图丰富关于金字塔结构下公司代理成本的研究。
[Abstract]:According to the agency theory, the agency cost in the process of corporate governance can be divided into the first type of agency cost between management and shareholders and the second kind of agency cost between large and small shareholders. Based on the above theory, this paper studies the intermediary role of two kinds of agency cost in the process of pyramid structure type affecting corporate efficiency. Through the empirical research on the data of listed companies in the gem from 2010 to 2014, it is found that the vertical level and horizontal span of pyramid structure have significantly reduced the two types of agency costs and improved the efficiency of listed companies. The two types of agency cost play a significant role in the process that the vertical level and horizontal span of pyramid structure affect the efficiency of the company, and the first type of agency cost is greater than the second kind of agency cost. This is different from previous studies on pyramid structure of mature listed companies. In order to ensure the reliability of the results, the robustness test is carried out in this paper. Based on the practice of gem, this paper gives a reasonable explanation from the point of view that ultimate controller uses pyramid structure to support corporate governance, and tries to enrich the research on corporate agency cost under pyramid structure.
【作者单位】：山东科技大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(20133718110009) 中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2015M582119)
【分类号】：F275

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