独立董事网络位置与盈余质量关系研究
发布时间：2018-08-11 11:07
【摘要】：财务报告反映上市公司的经营状况及财务状况,由于管理层薪酬往往依业绩而定,管理层为了自身利益的实现可能会暗箱操作,妨碍财务报告正常生成以达到粉饰报表的目的,这显然会降低公司盈余质量,从而不可避免地会侵害股东利益。改善公司内部治理结构,增强对管理层的监督约束可以有效改善这一状况。为了达到这一目的,我国于2001年颁布了《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》,以期独立董事可以在公司治理中发挥作用,监督约束管理层的行为。然而,自独立董事设立以来,其治理作用备受实务界和理论界的争议。随着社会关系理论的兴起,学者们开始用人与人之间的网络关系特征替代个人属性特征进行研究。因此,本文通过独立董事兼任构建社会网络关系,以独立董事在兼任网络中所处的位置衡量其治理能力,考察独立董事治理能力对上市公司盈余质量的影响。同时,考虑到信息的异质性,我们加入了网络约束系数指标,以独立董事占据的结构洞数量衡量其在网络中的中介作用。基于我国国有企业众多的现实背景,我们又将上市公司按照产权性质的不同划分为国有企业与非国有企业,研究产权性质的异质性是否会对独立董事的治理作用产生影响。进一步地,考虑到独立董事兼任上市公司数量不能超过五家的政策要求,我们试图探索独立董事兼任政策的合理性,以期找到是否存在最优独立董事兼任数量这一谜题的答案。经过理论分析与实证检验,本文发现独立董事的网络位置对盈余质量存在正向影响。处于网络中心位置的独立董事,其信息优势、知识优势、声誉效应、监督的意愿与动机明显强于网络边缘位置的独立董事,因而更能有效地发挥监督约束管理层的作用。通过对2011-2015年11029条数据进行分析,我们得出了如下结论:(1)我国独立董事制度能够对公司盈余质量的提升发挥治理作用。具体表现为:公司中独立董事的网络中心度越高,操纵性应计利润越小,盈余质量越高;公司中独立董事的网络约束系数越大,独立董事占据的结构洞越少,操纵性应计利润越小,盈余质量越高。(2)在非国有企业中,独立董事的治理作用显著高于国有企业中独立董事的治理作用。由此可见,产权性质的异质性会对独立董事的治理作用产生影响。(3)通过对独立董事兼任数量与盈余质量的研究,我们发现独立董事兼任数量越多,公司盈余质量越好。鉴于目前政策要求独立董事兼任数量不能超过5家公司,因此,在目前的政策背景下,不能得出是否存在最优独立董事兼任数量的结论。本文从独立董事的网络位置出发考察其对公司盈余质量的治理作用,对独立董事网络文献具有增量贡献。本文的研究结论对企业独立董事候选人员的选择、董事会结构设计以及衡量企业盈余质量可以提供启示。同时,对如何有效推进国有体制改革、发挥独立董事等公司治理机制的作用,提供了一些有价值的研究思考和现实启示。
[Abstract]:Financial reports reflect the operating and financial conditions of listed companies. Because management pay is often determined by performance, management may operate in secret to achieve their own interests, hinder the normal generation of financial reports to achieve the purpose of whitewashing statements, which will obviously reduce the quality of earnings, and thus inevitably infringe on shareholders'interests. In order to achieve this goal, China promulgated the Guiding Opinion on Establishing an Independent Director System in Listed Companies in 2001, in order to enable independent directors to play a role in corporate governance and supervise and restrain the behavior of management. However, since the establishment of independent directors, their governance role has been controversial both in practice and in theory. With the rise of social relations theory, scholars have begun to use the characteristics of interpersonal network relationship to replace the characteristics of personal attributes. At the same time, considering the heterogeneity of information, we add the index of network constraint coefficient to measure the intermediary role of independent directors in the network by the number of structural holes occupied by independent directors. In reality, we divide listed companies into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises according to the nature of property rights, and study whether the heterogeneity of property rights will affect the governance of independent directors. Through theoretical analysis and empirical test, this paper finds that the position of independent directors in the network has a positive impact on earnings quality. The willingness and motivation of supervision is obviously stronger than that of independent directors on the edge of the network, so they can play a more effective role in supervising and restraining the management. Through the analysis of 1,1029 data from 2011 to 2015, we draw the following conclusions: (1) The independent director system in China can play a governance role in improving the earnings quality of the company. The higher the network centrality of independent directors, the smaller the maneuvering accrued profits and the higher the earnings quality; the greater the network constraint coefficient of independent directors, the less the structural holes occupied by independent directors, the smaller the maneuvering accrued profits, and the higher the earnings quality. (2) In non-state-owned enterprises, the governance role of independent directors is significantly higher than that of the state. It can be seen that the heterogeneity of property right nature will have an impact on the governance of independent directors. (3) Through the study of the number and earnings quality of independent directors, we find that the more independent directors hold concurrent positions, the better the earnings quality of the company. The quantity of independent directors can not exceed 5 companies. Therefore, under the current policy background, it is impossible to draw a conclusion whether there is an optimal number of independent directors concurrently. The selection of candidates, the structure design of the board of directors and the measurement of earnings quality can provide enlightenment. At the same time, it also provides some valuable research thinking and practical enlightenment on how to effectively promote the reform of the state-owned system and play the role of independent directors and other corporate governance mechanisms.
【学位授予单位】：山东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F275
[Abstract]:Financial reports reflect the operating and financial conditions of listed companies. Because management pay is often determined by performance, management may operate in secret to achieve their own interests, hinder the normal generation of financial reports to achieve the purpose of whitewashing statements, which will obviously reduce the quality of earnings, and thus inevitably infringe on shareholders'interests. In order to achieve this goal, China promulgated the Guiding Opinion on Establishing an Independent Director System in Listed Companies in 2001, in order to enable independent directors to play a role in corporate governance and supervise and restrain the behavior of management. However, since the establishment of independent directors, their governance role has been controversial both in practice and in theory. With the rise of social relations theory, scholars have begun to use the characteristics of interpersonal network relationship to replace the characteristics of personal attributes. At the same time, considering the heterogeneity of information, we add the index of network constraint coefficient to measure the intermediary role of independent directors in the network by the number of structural holes occupied by independent directors. In reality, we divide listed companies into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises according to the nature of property rights, and study whether the heterogeneity of property rights will affect the governance of independent directors. Through theoretical analysis and empirical test, this paper finds that the position of independent directors in the network has a positive impact on earnings quality. The willingness and motivation of supervision is obviously stronger than that of independent directors on the edge of the network, so they can play a more effective role in supervising and restraining the management. Through the analysis of 1,1029 data from 2011 to 2015, we draw the following conclusions: (1) The independent director system in China can play a governance role in improving the earnings quality of the company. The higher the network centrality of independent directors, the smaller the maneuvering accrued profits and the higher the earnings quality; the greater the network constraint coefficient of independent directors, the less the structural holes occupied by independent directors, the smaller the maneuvering accrued profits, and the higher the earnings quality. (2) In non-state-owned enterprises, the governance role of independent directors is significantly higher than that of the state. It can be seen that the heterogeneity of property right nature will have an impact on the governance of independent directors. (3) Through the study of the number and earnings quality of independent directors, we find that the more independent directors hold concurrent positions, the better the earnings quality of the company. The quantity of independent directors can not exceed 5 companies. Therefore, under the current policy background, it is impossible to draw a conclusion whether there is an optimal number of independent directors concurrently. The selection of candidates, the structure design of the board of directors and the measurement of earnings quality can provide enlightenment. At the same time, it also provides some valuable research thinking and practical enlightenment on how to effectively promote the reform of the state-owned system and play the role of independent directors and other corporate governance mechanisms.
【学位授予单位】：山东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F275
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