薪酬管制会减少国有企业高管收入吗——来自政府“限薪令”的准自然实验
发布时间：2018-08-11 12:04
【摘要】：国有企业高管薪酬管制已是我国政府在收入分配领域的制度安排之一,但政策效果缺乏明确与统一的结论。本文基于不完全契约理论构建了一个政府与高管薪酬谈判的动态博弈模型,探讨了薪酬管制下实现高管有效激励的契约选择。在此基础上,借助2009年"限薪令"的实施作为薪酬管制的准自然实验,运用PSM-DID方法实证检验了限薪政策的干预效果。本研究发现,"限薪令"没有降低国有企业高管货币薪酬,但是有效减缓了货币薪酬的增长幅度,职工工资没有受到"限薪令"的影响;"限薪令"出台后地方国有企业在职消费显著增加,中央企业在职消费增加不明显。进一步探究限薪对高管与职工努力的影响,发现薪酬管制减少了企业过度投资、提高了全要素生产率,对高管和职工分别起到正向的规范效应和激励效应。本文的结论表明:薪酬管制约束了高管货币薪酬激励机制,在职消费可能成为地方国有企业高管获得隐性薪酬的替代性选择。因此,进行国有企业分类化管理、拓宽高管激励方式是国有企业高管薪酬治理的长效机制。
[Abstract]:The regulation of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises is one of the institutional arrangements in the field of income distribution of our government, but the effect of the policy lacks a clear and unified conclusion. Based on incomplete contract theory, this paper constructs a dynamic game model of executive compensation negotiation between government and executive, and discusses the choice of contract to realize executive effective incentive under compensation control. On this basis, with the implementation of the "pay restriction order" in 2009 as a quasi-natural experiment of salary control, this paper empirically tests the intervention effect of the wage restriction policy by using the PSM-DID method. This study found that the "pay restriction order" did not reduce the monetary compensation of executives in state-owned enterprises, but effectively slowed down the increase of monetary compensation. Employees' wages were not affected by the "wage restriction order"; after the "wage restriction order" was issued, the in-service consumption of local state-owned enterprises increased significantly, while the in-service consumption of central enterprises did not increase significantly. Further explore the effect of salary restriction on the efforts of executives and staff, found that compensation control reduces the overinvestment of enterprises, improves the total factor productivity, and plays a positive normative effect and incentive effect on executives and employees respectively. The conclusion of this paper is as follows: the compensation regulation constrains the monetary incentive mechanism of the executive, and the in-service consumption may become the alternative choice for the local state-owned enterprise executives to obtain the implicit compensation. Therefore, it is the long-term mechanism of the executive compensation governance of state-owned enterprises to carry out classified management of state-owned enterprises and broaden the ways of executive incentive.
【作者单位】： 西南财经大学财政税务学院;武汉大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重大项目(15ZDB158) 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71573194)的资助
【分类号】：F272.92
[Abstract]:The regulation of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises is one of the institutional arrangements in the field of income distribution of our government, but the effect of the policy lacks a clear and unified conclusion. Based on incomplete contract theory, this paper constructs a dynamic game model of executive compensation negotiation between government and executive, and discusses the choice of contract to realize executive effective incentive under compensation control. On this basis, with the implementation of the "pay restriction order" in 2009 as a quasi-natural experiment of salary control, this paper empirically tests the intervention effect of the wage restriction policy by using the PSM-DID method. This study found that the "pay restriction order" did not reduce the monetary compensation of executives in state-owned enterprises, but effectively slowed down the increase of monetary compensation. Employees' wages were not affected by the "wage restriction order"; after the "wage restriction order" was issued, the in-service consumption of local state-owned enterprises increased significantly, while the in-service consumption of central enterprises did not increase significantly. Further explore the effect of salary restriction on the efforts of executives and staff, found that compensation control reduces the overinvestment of enterprises, improves the total factor productivity, and plays a positive normative effect and incentive effect on executives and employees respectively. The conclusion of this paper is as follows: the compensation regulation constrains the monetary incentive mechanism of the executive, and the in-service consumption may become the alternative choice for the local state-owned enterprise executives to obtain the implicit compensation. Therefore, it is the long-term mechanism of the executive compensation governance of state-owned enterprises to carry out classified management of state-owned enterprises and broaden the ways of executive incentive.
【作者单位】： 西南财经大学财政税务学院;武汉大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金重大项目(15ZDB158) 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71573194)的资助
【分类号】：F272.92
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