中间品区别定价行为的竞争效应与反垄断规制——基于讨价还价理论的分析
发布时间：2018-08-15 15:30
【摘要】：随着整个产业链的主导权逐渐由上游厂商向下游厂商转移,下游厂商对市场控制能力不断上升,所具有的讨价还价能力也不断增强,进而导致上游厂商对中间品实行区别定价,并对下游弱势厂商产生"水床效应"。本文以上游垄断-下游寡头的市场结构为基准,在上下游厂商都具有一定讨价还价能力的情形下分析中间品区别定价的竞争效应。结果表明,当上游厂商选择讨价还价能力强的下游厂商进行统一定价协商时,统一定价时的消费者福利高于区别定价情形;当上游厂商选择讨价还价能力弱的下游厂商进行统一定价协商时,统一定价时的消费者福利低于区别定价情形;不论上游厂商选择强势或弱势下游厂商进行价格协商,统一定价时下游厂商的利润和社会总福利总是高于区别定价情形。因此,对中间品区别定价行为的反垄断规制应考虑到上下游厂商的讨价还价能力,应将"市场支配地位"标准延伸至"相对经济优势"。
[Abstract]:As the leading power of the whole industry chain is gradually transferred from the upstream manufacturer to the downstream firm, the downstream manufacturer's ability to control the market is constantly rising, and the bargaining power of the downstream manufacturer is also continuously enhanced, which leads to the upstream manufacturer to carry out the differentiated pricing of the intermediate goods. And to the downstream weak manufacturer produces "the water bed effect". Based on the market structure of upstream monopoly and downstream oligopoly, this paper analyzes the competitive effect of intermediate differential pricing under the condition that upstream and downstream firms have a certain bargaining power. The results show that when upstream firms choose downstream firms with strong bargaining power to negotiate unified pricing, consumers' welfare is higher than differential pricing. When upstream firms choose downstream firms with weak bargaining power to negotiate unified pricing, consumers' welfare is lower than differential pricing when unified pricing; whether upstream firms choose strong or weak downstream firms to negotiate prices, The profits and total social welfare of downstream firms are always higher than those of differential pricing. Therefore, the antitrust regulation of differentiated pricing of intermediate products should take into account the bargaining power of upstream and downstream firms, and extend the criterion of "market dominant position" to "relative economic advantage".
【作者单位】： 湖南农业大学经济学院;中南财经政法大学工商管理学院;肇庆学院经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金青年项目,项目编号:15CJY001 湖南省社科基金项目,项目编号:14YBA203 湖南省教育厅优秀青年项目资助 湖南省社科成果评审委员会课题,项目编号:XSP17YBZC086
【分类号】：F274
本文编号：2184631
[Abstract]:As the leading power of the whole industry chain is gradually transferred from the upstream manufacturer to the downstream firm, the downstream manufacturer's ability to control the market is constantly rising, and the bargaining power of the downstream manufacturer is also continuously enhanced, which leads to the upstream manufacturer to carry out the differentiated pricing of the intermediate goods. And to the downstream weak manufacturer produces "the water bed effect". Based on the market structure of upstream monopoly and downstream oligopoly, this paper analyzes the competitive effect of intermediate differential pricing under the condition that upstream and downstream firms have a certain bargaining power. The results show that when upstream firms choose downstream firms with strong bargaining power to negotiate unified pricing, consumers' welfare is higher than differential pricing. When upstream firms choose downstream firms with weak bargaining power to negotiate unified pricing, consumers' welfare is lower than differential pricing when unified pricing; whether upstream firms choose strong or weak downstream firms to negotiate prices, The profits and total social welfare of downstream firms are always higher than those of differential pricing. Therefore, the antitrust regulation of differentiated pricing of intermediate products should take into account the bargaining power of upstream and downstream firms, and extend the criterion of "market dominant position" to "relative economic advantage".
【作者单位】： 湖南农业大学经济学院;中南财经政法大学工商管理学院;肇庆学院经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金青年项目,项目编号:15CJY001 湖南省社科基金项目,项目编号:14YBA203 湖南省教育厅优秀青年项目资助 湖南省社科成果评审委员会课题,项目编号:XSP17YBZC086
【分类号】：F274
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