后发国家企业技术创新的伯特兰竞争困境研究

发布时间：2018-09-13 14:04

【摘要】：传统观点认为,拥有技术创新后发优势的发展中国家通过加大技术创新投入能够分享发达国家垄断的超额利润。这是基于后发国家追赶企业与先进国家领先企业处于产量博弈假设下的结论。但先进国家领先企业不会轻易放弃垄断利润,可能以伯特兰价格竞争方式甚至掠夺性定价方式遏制后发国家追赶企业,令后者的技术创新无法获取预期利润并陷入财务困境,由此引致后者面临技术引进与技术创新的两难选择,笔者称之为伯特兰竞争困境。创新性地从博弈角度分析了伯特兰竞争困境对追赶企业技术创新动力的负面影响,指出技术引进是伯特兰竞争困境下追赶企业理性选择的结果。总结了化解伯特兰竞争困境的国际经验,并对后发国家追赶企业摆脱伯特兰竞争困境提出针对性的政策建议。
[Abstract]:The traditional view is that developing countries with the advantage of technological innovation can share the excess profits of developed countries by increasing investment in technological innovation. This is based on the conclusion that the catch-up firms in the developing countries and the leading firms in the advanced countries are under the hypothesis of output game. However, leading companies in advanced countries will not easily give up monopoly profits, and may use Bertrand price competition or even predatory pricing to deter latecomer countries from catching up with enterprises, so that the latter's technological innovations will not be able to obtain the expected profits and lead to financial difficulties. As a result, the latter faces a dilemma between technology introduction and technological innovation, which the author calls Bertrand's competitive dilemma. This paper analyzes the negative influence of Bertrand's competitive predicament on the driving force of technological innovation of catching up firms from the angle of game theory, and points out that technology introduction is the result of rational choice of pursuing firms in Bertrand's competitive predicament. This paper summarizes the international experience in resolving the competitive dilemma of Bertrand, and puts forward some relevant policy suggestions for the catch-up enterprises in the developing countries to get rid of the competitive dilemma of Bertrand.
【作者单位】：福州大学经济与管理学院;
【分类号】：F273.1

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