终极产权性质下高管持股与会计稳健性的关系研究
发布时间：2018-10-04 18:34
【摘要】：股权分置改革后我国资本市场形成了国有股、法人股和社会公众股三种流通的股权形式。在这三种不同的产权性质下,高管持股仍然可能对会计稳健性产生以下两种影响;一是激发高管的积极性,降低委托代理成本,为企业创造更多的价值;二是在委托代理理论中的“管理者自利行为”仍然存在,可能产生高管为了达到公司业绩目标而操纵财务信息,降低会计信息的稳健性。本文采用我国A股市场2010年至2015年这6年的数据,对高管持股、终极产权性质、终极产权性质与高管持股关系以及终极产权性质下,高管持股与会计稳健性的关系进行全面分析。结合我国的国情进行实证分析发现:国有企业,高管持股与会计稳健性负相关且效应显著;法人股控股企业,高管持股与会计稳健性负相关但不显著;社会公众股控股企业,高管持股与会计稳健性正相关且效应显著。原因主要有以下几个方面:(1)由于国有资产的所有权缺位导致容易出现政府干预和内部人控制问题,并且国有企业存在层层委托代理关系,代理链条过长使国家很难监管国有资产,高管持股会导致企业会计稳健性降低。(2)我国的资本市场还是处于不太成熟度的阶段,市场本身的不健全,法人股控股股东会进行短期投资行为以进行套利。法人股股东并没有对公司高管产生多大的监督作用,所以高管持股降低了会计信息的稳健性。但是可能是由于我国近年来的市场改革体现法律体系建设,使得监管环境有所改善。以至于在法人股控股公司,高管持股与会计稳健性的负相关关系并不显著。(3)社会公众控股的上市公司,上市公司的业绩会直接关系着社会公众的切身利益。社会公众股控股公司,控股股东有很强的意愿监督公司高管的行为,高管为了私利进行内部操控的可行性较小。并且社会公众股控制公司,高管持股比例很高,高管能够很好的享受企业长期剩余收益的果实,高管会切实关注企业的长期发展。高管与股东形成一致的利益目标,社会公众股控股公司,高管持股与会计稳健性正相关且效应显著。不同的终极产权性质下,为了更好的处理高管持股与会计稳健性的关系,有以下四点建议:(1)不断发展我国资本市场,健全国有控股监管机制;(2)强化市场监管,健全法人股控股监管机制;(3)进一步开放市场,促进社会公众股控股企业的发展;(4)每个企业应当积极提高高管素质,完善企业的内部治理结构。
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure, the capital market of our country has formed three kinds of circulating equity forms: state-owned stock, legal person stock and social public stock. Under these three different property rights, executive ownership may still have the following two effects on accounting conservatism: one is to stimulate the enthusiasm of executives, reduce the cost of principal-agent, and create more value for enterprises; Second, the "self-interest behavior of managers" still exists in the principal-agent theory, which may lead to executives manipulating financial information in order to achieve the corporate performance goal and reduce the conservatism of accounting information. This paper uses the data of six years from 2010 to 2015 in China's A-share market to analyze the ownership of senior executives, the relationship between the nature of the ultimate property right and the ownership of senior executives, as well as the nature of the ultimate property right. The relationship between executive ownership and accounting conservatism is comprehensively analyzed. Combined with the situation of China, empirical analysis found that: state-owned enterprises, executive ownership and accounting conservatism negative correlation and significant effect; legal holding enterprises, executive ownership and accounting conservatism negative correlation, but not significant; social public share holding enterprises. Executive ownership and accounting conservatism are positively correlated and have significant effects. The main reasons are as follows: (1) due to the lack of ownership of state-owned assets, the problems of government intervention and insider control are easy to appear, and there are many principal-agent relationships in state-owned enterprises. The long chain of agency makes it difficult for the state to supervise the state-owned assets, and the ownership of senior managers will lead to the decrease of accounting conservatism. (2) the capital market of our country is still in the stage of immaturity, and the market itself is not perfect. Corporate shareholders will carry out short-term investment to carry out arbitrage. Corporate shareholders do not have much oversight over corporate executives, so executive ownership reduces the conservatism of accounting information. But it is possible that the market reform in recent years reflects the construction of legal system, which improves the regulatory environment. Even in corporate holding companies, the negative correlation between executive ownership and accounting conservatism is not significant. (3) listed companies controlled by the public, the performance of listed companies will directly affect the immediate interests of the public. Public stock holding companies, controlling shareholders have a strong willingness to supervise the behavior of the company's executives, executives for private interests to carry out internal manipulation is less feasible. And the public shares control companies, the proportion of executive ownership is very high, executives can enjoy the fruits of long-term residual income, executives will really pay attention to the long-term development of enterprises. Executives and shareholders form a consistent interest goal, social public stock holding companies, executive ownership and accounting conservatism is positively related and significant effect. Under different ultimate property rights, in order to better deal with the relationship between executive ownership and accounting conservatism, there are four suggestions: (1) to continuously develop China's capital market and perfect the supervision mechanism of state-owned holding; (2) to strengthen market supervision; Third, to further open the market to promote the development of public stock holding enterprises; (4) every enterprise should actively improve the quality of senior executives, improve the internal governance structure of enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F272.91;F832.51
本文编号：2251440
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure, the capital market of our country has formed three kinds of circulating equity forms: state-owned stock, legal person stock and social public stock. Under these three different property rights, executive ownership may still have the following two effects on accounting conservatism: one is to stimulate the enthusiasm of executives, reduce the cost of principal-agent, and create more value for enterprises; Second, the "self-interest behavior of managers" still exists in the principal-agent theory, which may lead to executives manipulating financial information in order to achieve the corporate performance goal and reduce the conservatism of accounting information. This paper uses the data of six years from 2010 to 2015 in China's A-share market to analyze the ownership of senior executives, the relationship between the nature of the ultimate property right and the ownership of senior executives, as well as the nature of the ultimate property right. The relationship between executive ownership and accounting conservatism is comprehensively analyzed. Combined with the situation of China, empirical analysis found that: state-owned enterprises, executive ownership and accounting conservatism negative correlation and significant effect; legal holding enterprises, executive ownership and accounting conservatism negative correlation, but not significant; social public share holding enterprises. Executive ownership and accounting conservatism are positively correlated and have significant effects. The main reasons are as follows: (1) due to the lack of ownership of state-owned assets, the problems of government intervention and insider control are easy to appear, and there are many principal-agent relationships in state-owned enterprises. The long chain of agency makes it difficult for the state to supervise the state-owned assets, and the ownership of senior managers will lead to the decrease of accounting conservatism. (2) the capital market of our country is still in the stage of immaturity, and the market itself is not perfect. Corporate shareholders will carry out short-term investment to carry out arbitrage. Corporate shareholders do not have much oversight over corporate executives, so executive ownership reduces the conservatism of accounting information. But it is possible that the market reform in recent years reflects the construction of legal system, which improves the regulatory environment. Even in corporate holding companies, the negative correlation between executive ownership and accounting conservatism is not significant. (3) listed companies controlled by the public, the performance of listed companies will directly affect the immediate interests of the public. Public stock holding companies, controlling shareholders have a strong willingness to supervise the behavior of the company's executives, executives for private interests to carry out internal manipulation is less feasible. And the public shares control companies, the proportion of executive ownership is very high, executives can enjoy the fruits of long-term residual income, executives will really pay attention to the long-term development of enterprises. Executives and shareholders form a consistent interest goal, social public stock holding companies, executive ownership and accounting conservatism is positively related and significant effect. Under different ultimate property rights, in order to better deal with the relationship between executive ownership and accounting conservatism, there are four suggestions: (1) to continuously develop China's capital market and perfect the supervision mechanism of state-owned holding; (2) to strengthen market supervision; Third, to further open the market to promote the development of public stock holding enterprises; (4) every enterprise should actively improve the quality of senior executives, improve the internal governance structure of enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F272.91;F832.51
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