国有企业改革中的员工持股制度分析——基于交易成本理论的视角

发布时间：2018-10-04 20:10

【摘要】：在我国30多年的员工持股制度实践历程中出现了各种问题,归结起来主要有两个方面:一是在制度设计方面,缺乏长期规划和顶层设计,忽视与其他制度的兼容性与一致性,与员工持股计划相关的法律法规体系也还不够完善,致使企业容易出现暗箱操作和利益输送等违规行为以及制度执行成本过高的问题;二是在具体操作方面,由于缺乏成熟经验,员工持股计划趋于福利性和短期行为化,无法达到长期激励的效果。员工持股制度的优越性体现在其将资本与劳动这两种企业重要的生产要素结合起来,员工能参与企业的利润分成及共担风险,员工和企业有相同的利益诉求,从而对员工形成一种长效激励。因此,要保证员工持股真正发挥其激励作用,需要对员工持有股份设定最低持有年限,在最低年限内不得转让其所持有股份。
[Abstract]:There are many problems in the practice of ESOP system in our country for more than 30 years, which can be summed up in two aspects: one is the lack of long-term planning and top-level design, and the neglect of compatibility and consistency with other systems. The system of laws and regulations related to ESOP is also not perfect, which makes enterprises prone to illegal behaviors such as dark box operation and transfer of benefits, as well as excessive cost of system execution. Second, in terms of specific operation, Due to the lack of mature experience, ESOP tends to be welfare and short-term behavior, which can not achieve the effect of long-term incentive. The advantage of ESOP system lies in the combination of capital and labor, the employees can participate in the profit sharing and share the risks, and the employees and the enterprises have the same interest demand. Thus form a kind of long-term motivation to the staff. Therefore, in order to ensure that ESOP can really play its incentive role, it is necessary to set the minimum holding period for employees to hold shares, and not to transfer the shares they hold within the minimum term.
【作者单位】：吉林大学中国国有经济研究中心;吉林大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金一般项目“国资管理从‘管资产’为主向‘管资本’为主转变研究”(17BJY164)
【分类号】：F271;F272.92;F276.1

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