高管持股对创新可持续性的影响研究——兼论高管过度自信与产权性质的调节效应

发布时间：2018-10-26 14:26

【摘要】：企业创新活动一旦中断将会产生巨大的调整成本损失。因此,如何保持企业创新可持续性是企业创新研究的重要问题。结合委托代理理论,探索了企业高管持股对创新可持续性的影响,并进一步讨论了高管过度自信与产权性质的调节作用。使用2003-2014年中国A股制造业上市公司面板数据进行实证分析,结果表明:高管持股对企业创新可持续性具有显著正向影响,高管过度自信则弱化了两者间正向关系,而相对于非民营企业,民营企业高管持股对创新可持续性的正向作用更强。同时考虑两种情境效应的综合影响时,在民营企业中高管过度自信的负向调节作用更强。最后,考虑了遗漏变量带来的“选择偏差问题”和内生性问题,采用基于Kernel匹配得分法的反事实检验,为实证结果提供了稳健性证明。
[Abstract]:The enterprise innovation activity once interrupted will produce the huge adjustment cost loss. Therefore, how to maintain the sustainability of enterprise innovation is an important issue in the research of enterprise innovation. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper explores the impact of executive ownership on innovation sustainability, and further discusses the regulatory role of executive overconfidence and property rights. Using panel data of Chinese A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2003 to 2014, the results show that executive ownership has a significant positive impact on innovation sustainability, while executive overconfidence weakens the positive relationship between the two. Compared with non-private enterprises, the executive ownership of private enterprises plays a more positive role in innovation sustainability. At the same time, considering the combined effects of the two situations, the negative regulation effect of overconfidence is stronger in private enterprises. Finally, considering the "selection deviation problem" and the endogenous problem brought by the missing variables, we use the counterfactual test based on the Kernel matching score method to prove the robustness of the empirical results.
【作者单位】：南京师范大学商学院;南京大学教育研究院;
【分类号】：F273.1

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