官员任期、年龄限制与地方企业投资——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2018-11-05 09:44

【摘要】：既有文献在分析官员任期与企业投资的关系时,忽略了年龄限制对官员晋升的关键作用。本文将官员分为晋升受年龄限制和不受年龄限制两大类,通过一个简单的两阶段模型刻画了官员任期与企业投资之间的关系。然后,基于1999—2015年中国的市委书记与上市公司的数据对理论结果进行了经验检验。分析表明,在任期和企业投资的关系上,两类官员的确存在显著差异;特别地,不受年龄限制的官员,任期与企业投资之间呈现出理论模型所刻画的U型关系。
[Abstract]:In the analysis of the relationship between official tenure and enterprise investment, the existing literature neglects the key role of age restriction in the promotion of officials. In this paper, officials are divided into two categories: promotion is restricted by age and not by age, and the relationship between tenure of officials and enterprise investment is described by a simple two-stage model. Then, based on the data of the party secretaries and listed companies from 1999 to 2015, the theoretical results are tested empirically. The analysis shows that there is a significant difference between the two types of officials in the relationship between tenure and enterprise investment, especially the U-shaped relationship between tenure and enterprise investment, which is not limited by age.
【作者单位】：上海理工大学管理学院;复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(15YJC790158);教育部人文社科重点基地项目(14JJD790014) 国家自然科学基金项目(71373050)
【分类号】：D630.3;F275

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