考虑资金约束时易腐品二级供应链中延迟支付策略研究
发布时间：2018-11-21 20:12
【摘要】：文章研究了易腐品二级供应链中的延迟支付策略问题,对于资金充足和资金受限两种情景,分别给出了没有延迟支付和存在延迟支付时零售商及供应商的利润模型及最优策略,并建立了供应商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,设计了求解均衡解的粒子群优化算法.最后,通过数值算例探讨了延付期、批发价格及延付利息的变化对零售商和供应商利润的影响,得到了零售商的最优订货策略以及供应商的最优延迟支付决策,对零售商是否接受延迟支付策略进行了权衡分析.结果表明,短期的延付期是可以提高零售商和供应商的利润,但延付期的延长不一定带来零售商利润的提升,同样供应商也无法从零售商手中赚取额外利息利润,反而降低了供应商的利润.另外,资金受限下零售商采用延付通常能够取得更高的收益,同时供应商能够通过提高批发价和利息获得更大利润.
[Abstract]:In this paper, the problem of delayed payment strategy in the secondary supply chain of perishable goods is studied. For the two scenarios of sufficient funds and limited funds, the profit model and optimal strategy of retailers and suppliers with no delay payment and with delay payment are given respectively. The vendor-led Stackelberg game model is established and the particle swarm optimization algorithm is designed to solve the equilibrium solution. Finally, through numerical examples, the effects of delay period, wholesale price and deferred interest on the profit of retailers and suppliers are discussed, and the optimal ordering strategy of retailers and the optimal delay payment decision of suppliers are obtained. A tradeoff analysis is made on whether retailers accept the delayed payment strategy. The results show that the short delay period can increase the profits of retailers and suppliers, but the extension of the delay period does not necessarily lead to the increase of retailer profits, nor can suppliers earn additional interest profits from retailers. On the contrary, it reduces the profit of suppliers. In addition, retailers with limited funds usually make higher profits by using deferred payments, while suppliers can make greater profits by raising wholesale prices and interest rates.
【作者单位】： 北京化工大学理学院;中国太平保险控股有限公司;北京工业大学经济管理学院北京现代制造业发展研究基地;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71571010)资助课题
【分类号】：F274
[Abstract]:In this paper, the problem of delayed payment strategy in the secondary supply chain of perishable goods is studied. For the two scenarios of sufficient funds and limited funds, the profit model and optimal strategy of retailers and suppliers with no delay payment and with delay payment are given respectively. The vendor-led Stackelberg game model is established and the particle swarm optimization algorithm is designed to solve the equilibrium solution. Finally, through numerical examples, the effects of delay period, wholesale price and deferred interest on the profit of retailers and suppliers are discussed, and the optimal ordering strategy of retailers and the optimal delay payment decision of suppliers are obtained. A tradeoff analysis is made on whether retailers accept the delayed payment strategy. The results show that the short delay period can increase the profits of retailers and suppliers, but the extension of the delay period does not necessarily lead to the increase of retailer profits, nor can suppliers earn additional interest profits from retailers. On the contrary, it reduces the profit of suppliers. In addition, retailers with limited funds usually make higher profits by using deferred payments, while suppliers can make greater profits by raising wholesale prices and interest rates.
【作者单位】： 北京化工大学理学院;中国太平保险控股有限公司;北京工业大学经济管理学院北京现代制造业发展研究基地;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71571010)资助课题
【分类号】：F274
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