控制链长度与公司高管薪酬契约

发布时间：2018-11-23 17:32

【摘要】：本文研究了金字塔结构企业集团中最终控制人的控制链长度对高管薪酬契约的影响。研究发现:控制链较长,高管薪酬水平较高、薪酬业绩敏感性较低。进一步研究表明,薪酬较高能缓解控制链较长对公司业绩的负面影响;促进关联交易和增加信息扭曲给公司带来的风险是控制链长度降低高管薪酬业绩敏感性的重要渠道;没有证据表明控制链长度会通过降低盈余质量而降低高管薪酬敏感性;控制链长度与薪酬业绩敏感性的负向关系在高管持有股份的公司和国有控股公司中较弱;控制链长度与高管薪酬水平的正向关系在国有控股公司中较强。综合来看,相比寻租观,有效契约观对控制链长度与高管薪酬契约的关系具有更强的解释和预测能力。本文丰富了金字塔结构的经济后果与高管薪酬影响因素方面的研究。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the effect of chain length of final controller on executive compensation contract in pyramid structure enterprise group. The study found that the chain of control is longer, the executive compensation level is higher, and the pay performance sensitivity is lower. Further research shows that higher compensation can mitigate the negative impact of long chain of control on the performance of the company, promote related party transactions and increase the risk of information distortion is an important channel for the length of control chain to reduce the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. There is no evidence that the length of the chain of control can reduce the sensitivity of executive compensation by reducing the quality of earnings, and the negative relationship between the length of control chain and the sensitivity of salary performance is weaker in the companies in which the executives hold shares and the state-owned holding companies. The positive relationship between the length of control chain and executive compensation level is stronger in state-owned holding companies. In general, the effective contract view has a stronger ability to explain and predict the relationship between the length of the control chain and the executive compensation contract than the rent-seeking view. This paper enriches the research on the economic consequences of pyramid structure and the influencing factors of executive compensation.
【作者单位】：对外经济贸易大学国际商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71202028) 对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金——对外经济贸易大学优秀青年学者培育计划(15YQ05)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F271;F272.92;F275

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