管理层持股对公司透明度影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-12-25 15:11

【摘要】：近年来国际以及国内频频爆发会计信息披露造假案,使得公司管理者逐渐意识到提升信息公开性的重要意义,于是如何提高公司透明度很快被提上议事日程。而现代公司最基本的特征是所有权和经营权的分离,这引发了一定程度上的代理问题,使得代理人可能会因为追求自身利益从而有损于公司利益。国内外很多研究表明,管理者持股作为一种激励措施,能有效地降低两权分离下所产生的代理成本,从而使代理人与委托人的利益趋于一致。本文选用2010—2014年深市A股主板市场的上市公司共2188组数据作为研究样本,在信号传递理论、利益趋同假说的基础上应用回归模型,并选择公司透明度为被解释变量,股票报酬优化、管理层持股比例、高管离职、前十大股东股权相对集中程度为解释变量,公司规模、负债水平、资产报酬率、董事长与总经理是否兼任为控制变量,得出如下结论:(1)我国上市公司管理层持股比例与公司透明度之间显著正相关;(2)管理层离职动机对公司透明度具有显著的负面影响;(3)规模越大、资产回报越好、内部治理情况良好的公司更倾向于信息披露。并根据以上研究结论提出相关提高公司透明度的政策建议:(1)建立合理的股权结构,包括确定管理层持股比例和前十大股东股权集中度,使之符合股权激励制度;(2)完善监管力度,使信息披露行为规范化;(3)加强上市公司的信用素质以及道德诚信建设;(4)尽快建立一套全面完整的体系来评估上市公司信息披露质量。就我国而言,由于引入管理层持股制度较晚,再加上上市公司内部治理机制尚不够完善,使得公司透明度问题显得尤为突出,因此为了增加透明度,我国在实施管理层激励性报酬契约时,要引导上市公司合理利用股权激励方式。
[Abstract]:In recent years, international and domestic accounting information disclosure fraud cases frequently broke out, making corporate managers gradually aware of the importance of promoting information openness, so how to improve corporate transparency was quickly put on the agenda. The most basic feature of modern companies is the separation of ownership and management, which leads to a certain degree of agency problems, which may cause agents to pursue their own interests and thus harm the interests of the company. Many studies at home and abroad show that as an incentive measure, managerial shareholding can effectively reduce the agency cost under the separation of the two rights, thus making the interests of the agent and the principal tend to converge. In this paper, a total of 2188 sets of data of listed companies in Shenzhen A-share main Board market from 2010 to 2014 are selected as the research samples. The regression model is applied on the basis of signal transmission theory and interest convergence hypothesis, and corporate transparency is chosen as the explained variable. Stock compensation optimization, management shareholding ratio, executive turnover, the relative concentration of the top ten shareholders are explanatory variables, company size, debt level, return on assets, whether the chairman and the general manager are both control variables, The conclusions are as follows: (1) there is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of managerial shareholding and the transparency of listed companies in China; (2) Management turnover motivation has a significant negative impact on corporate transparency; (3) the larger the scale, the better the return on assets, and the better internal governance companies tend to disclose information. According to the above conclusions, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to improve the transparency of the company: (1) to establish a reasonable ownership structure, including determining the proportion of management ownership and the concentration of the top ten shareholders, so as to make it conform to the equity incentive system; (2) perfecting supervision to standardize the behavior of information disclosure; (3) strengthening the credit quality and moral integrity construction of listed companies; (4) establishing a comprehensive and complete system to evaluate the information disclosure quality of listed companies as soon as possible. As far as China is concerned, due to the late introduction of the management shareholding system and the imperfect internal governance mechanism of listed companies, the issue of corporate transparency is particularly prominent, so in order to increase transparency, In China, we should guide the listed companies to make use of the equity incentive when implementing the incentive compensation contract.
【学位授予单位】：兰州财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F271

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