企业投资效率的范式演化与框架构建——基于文献分析的视角

发布时间：2019-03-18 16:27

【摘要】：信息不对称理论和委托代理理论是投资—现金流敏感度问题的两大理论基础及分歧所在,并由此产生了融资约束假说下的投资不足问题和自由现金流假说下的过度投资问题。相关学者通过建立不同模型对引起投资—现金流敏感度的融资约束和代理成本进行了识别检验,并在定量测算企业投资效率的基础上,从产权性质与政治关联、财务政策、内外部治理机制、行为金融决策等角度检验了企业投资效率的影响因素与治理机制。为此,梳理有关企业投资效率的范式演化进程并构建其研究框架,有助于厘清企业投资效率的研究脉络与未来的研究方向。
[Abstract]:Information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory are the two theoretical bases and divergences of the sensitivity of investment-cash flow, which leads to the underinvestment problem under the financing constraint hypothesis and the over-investment problem under the free cash flow hypothesis. By establishing different models, the relevant scholars identify and test the financing constraints and agency costs that cause the sensitivity of investment-cash flow, and on the basis of quantitative measurement of the investment efficiency of enterprises, from the nature of property rights and political correlation, financial policy, From the angle of internal and external governance mechanism, behavioral financial decision-making and so on, this paper examines the influencing factors and governance mechanism of enterprise investment efficiency. Therefore, it is helpful to clarify the research context and future research direction of enterprise investment efficiency by combing the evolution process of paradigm and constructing its research framework.
【作者单位】：吉林大学数量经济研究中心暨商学院;吉林大学商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“新常态下我国资本市场与经济增长的长期协调发展研究”(项目号:16JJD790016) 国家自然科学基金项目“现代金融理论和金融实践的二重分歧及解决路径的理论与方法”(项目号:71273112)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F275

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