高管权力与薪酬契约:基于市场竞争的实证研究

发布时间：2019-07-05 11:06

【摘要】：基于我国企业治理机制不够完善的现实,本研究以2007-2014年期间我国A股上市企业为样本,采用动态GMM估计方法,重点研究了高管权力对薪酬契约的影响,以及市场竞争对高管权力与高管薪酬之间关系的调节作用。研究结论:(1)我国企业高管权力的膨胀可能导致其在高管薪酬契约的制定中谋求私利,从而获得更高的薪酬;(2)市场竞争作为企业的外部影响因素,能够有效地减少管理层利用权力影响高管薪酬的可能,提高高管薪酬设置的客观性;(3)国有企业由于缺乏股东与董事会的有效监督,从而高管权力对高管薪酬的影响在国有企业中更为显著。对此,各类企业尤其是国有企业应进一步完善企业治理机制,同时结合市场竞争效应,充分发挥董事与监事的监管作用,制约高管权力的过度膨胀,合理制定高管薪酬,充分发挥薪酬契约的激励作用,以保证股东的利益与企业价值的持续增长。
[Abstract]:Based on the reality that the corporate governance mechanism of our country is not perfect, this study uses the dynamic GMM to estimate the effect of the executive power on the compensation contract by using the dynamic GMM estimation method for the sample of the Chinese A-share listed enterprise in the period of 2007-2014. And the effect of market competition on the relationship between executive power and executive compensation. The research conclusion: (1) The expansion of the corporate executive power of our country may lead to its self-interest in the development of the executive compensation contract, so as to obtain higher compensation; (2) the market competition is the external influence factor of the enterprise, (3) The effect of executive power on executive compensation is more significant in the state-owned enterprises due to the lack of effective supervision by the shareholders and the board of directors. In this regard, all kinds of enterprises, especially the state-owned enterprises, should further improve the enterprise governance mechanism, combine the market competition effect, give full play to the supervision function of the directors and the supervisors, restrict the overexpansion of the executive power, make the executive compensation reasonably, and give full play to the incentive function of the compensation contract, So as to ensure the growth of the interests of the shareholders and the value of the enterprise.
【作者单位】：青岛大学商学院会计系;
【基金】：教育部人文社科规划项目(编号:15YJA630015);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(编号:15YJA630026)的部分成果
【分类号】：F272.92;F272.91

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