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基于战略消费者的单产品动态定价研究

发布时间:2019-07-07 07:10
【摘要】:产品价格直接决定企业利润,定价决策是零售商的永恒主题。随着科技的发展和创新的推动,产品生命周期缩短、逾期价格较低,传统定价策略很难适用。随着消费者越来越具有理性,面对心仪的商品不会立即购买,而是通过观察,对零售商未来的折价策略和库存状况形成理性预期,追求自身消费者剩余最大化来合理安排购买时机,这样的消费者称为战略消费者。零售商忽视战略消费者的延迟购买行为会导致巨大的收益损失。在细分消费者的基础上,动态定价立足于分阶段实行价格弹性满足更多的消费者。动态定价对缓解战略消费者延迟购买行为和增加零售商收益具有重要的作用。在消费者固定需求条件下,本文考虑到消费者在打折期存在买不到商品的风险,以一种新的思路基于两阶段消费者剩余的比较,构建消费者购买决策模型。通过分析消费者购买转移行为,求出两阶段购买产品的消费者数量并构建零售商收益函数,然后基于零售商追求利润最大化的目标求解零售商最优动态定价策略和利润。在本文所构建的零售商销售单产品两阶段动态定价模型基础上,分析了信息透明在零售商与消费者Stackelberg博弈中的重要性,指出差价补偿机制能够缓解战略消费者的影响。最后基于本文所构建的单产品两阶段动态定价模型做实例分析,通过数值模拟求解零售商最优动态定价策略,达到理论与应用的结合,为零售商动态定价决策提供一种新的思路和参考。在实例分析的基础上,探讨本文所构建的两阶段动态定价模型中参数的变化对零售商最优产品定价和零售商利润的影响。然后基于参数影响,提出零售商动态定价的一些建议。最后指出了本文主要研究结论和未来模型拓展的方向。
文内图片:Lp与1p函数关系图
图片说明:Lp与1p函数关系图
[Abstract]:Product price directly determines the profit of the enterprise, and pricing decision is the eternal theme of retailers. With the development of science and technology and the promotion of innovation, the product life cycle is shortened and the overdue price is low, so the traditional pricing strategy is difficult to apply. As consumers become more and more rational, the desired goods will not buy immediately, but through observation, the future discount strategy and inventory situation of retailers form rational expectations, and pursue the maximization of their own consumer surplus to arrange the purchase opportunity reasonably. Such consumers are called strategic consumers. Retailers neglecting the delayed purchase behavior of strategic consumers will lead to huge revenue losses. On the basis of subdividing consumers, dynamic pricing is based on the phased implementation of price elasticity to meet more consumers. Dynamic pricing plays an important role in alleviating the delayed purchase behavior of strategic consumers and increasing the revenue of retailers. Under the condition of fixed demand of consumers, this paper takes into account the risk that consumers can not buy goods during the discount period, and constructs a consumer purchase decision model based on the comparison of two-stage consumer surplus with a new idea. By analyzing the behavior of consumer purchase and transfer, the number of consumers who buy products in two stages is obtained and the profit function of retailers is constructed, and then the optimal dynamic pricing strategy and profit of retailers are solved based on the goal of maximizing profits. On the basis of the two-stage dynamic pricing model of retailers' single-product sales, this paper analyzes the importance of information transparency in the Stackelberg game between retailers and consumers, and points out that the price difference compensation mechanism can alleviate the influence of strategic consumers. Finally, based on the single product two-stage dynamic pricing model constructed in this paper, the optimal dynamic pricing strategy of retailers is solved by numerical simulation, which achieves the combination of theory and application, and provides a new idea and reference for retailers to make dynamic pricing decisions. On the basis of example analysis, this paper discusses the influence of the parameters in the two-stage dynamic pricing model on the optimal product pricing and the profit of retailers. Then, based on the influence of parameters, some suggestions on dynamic pricing of retailers are put forward. Finally, the main research conclusions and the future model expansion direction are pointed out.
【学位授予单位】:河北大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274

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