企业持续创新影响因素研究
发布时间：2019-08-17 14:50
【摘要】：使用持续专利时间、持续专利数量、持续发明时间和持续发明数量对企业持续创新进行测度,就公司规模、企业盈利能力、债权融资水平、股权结构和高管激励等对企业持续创新的影响进行理论分析,提出相关假设,并以国泰安"中国上市公司专利研究数据库"1985-2015年涉及的1 921家上市公司为样本进行实证检验。结果发现:公司规模与企业持续创新正相关;盈利能力和债权融资水平对企业持续创新的影响不显著;股权结构中,第一大股东持股比例与持续专利时间、持续发明时间负相关,对持续专利数量和持续发明数量的影响不显著。机构投资者持股比例与企业持续专利时间正相关,对其它持续创新变量的正向影响不显著;在高管激励中,以薪酬测度的高管短期激励与企业持续创新正相关,以持股比例测度的高管长期激励对企业持续创新的积极作用没有得到完全发挥。
[Abstract]:The continuous innovation of an enterprise is measured by using the continuous patent time, the number of continuous patents, the continuous invention time and the number of continuous inventions. The influence of the size of the company, the profitability of the enterprise, the level of debt financing, the ownership structure and the executive incentive on the sustainable innovation of the enterprise is analyzed theoretically, and the relevant assumptions are put forward. A sample of 1 921 listed companies involved in Guotai'an Patent Research Database of China listed companies from 1985 to 2015 was taken as an empirical test. The results show that the size of the company is positively correlated with the continuous innovation of the enterprise, the influence of profitability and creditor's rights financing level on the sustainable innovation of the enterprise is not significant, in the ownership structure, the proportion of the largest shareholder is negatively correlated with the duration of patent and the time of continuous invention, but the influence on the number of continuous patents and the number of continuous inventions is not significant. The proportion of institutional investors' shareholding is positively correlated with the duration of corporate patents, but the positive effect on other continuous innovation variables is not significant. In executive incentive, the short-term incentive measured by compensation is positively correlated with the continuous innovation of enterprises, while the positive role of long-term incentive measured by shareholding ratio on sustainable innovation has not been brought into full play.
【作者单位】： 河南科技大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(U1204704/G0202) 国家社会科学基金项目(16BJY070) 河南省高等学校哲学社会科学优秀学者基金项目(2014-YXXZ-17)
【分类号】：F273.1
本文编号：2527855
[Abstract]:The continuous innovation of an enterprise is measured by using the continuous patent time, the number of continuous patents, the continuous invention time and the number of continuous inventions. The influence of the size of the company, the profitability of the enterprise, the level of debt financing, the ownership structure and the executive incentive on the sustainable innovation of the enterprise is analyzed theoretically, and the relevant assumptions are put forward. A sample of 1 921 listed companies involved in Guotai'an Patent Research Database of China listed companies from 1985 to 2015 was taken as an empirical test. The results show that the size of the company is positively correlated with the continuous innovation of the enterprise, the influence of profitability and creditor's rights financing level on the sustainable innovation of the enterprise is not significant, in the ownership structure, the proportion of the largest shareholder is negatively correlated with the duration of patent and the time of continuous invention, but the influence on the number of continuous patents and the number of continuous inventions is not significant. The proportion of institutional investors' shareholding is positively correlated with the duration of corporate patents, but the positive effect on other continuous innovation variables is not significant. In executive incentive, the short-term incentive measured by compensation is positively correlated with the continuous innovation of enterprises, while the positive role of long-term incentive measured by shareholding ratio on sustainable innovation has not been brought into full play.
【作者单位】： 河南科技大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(U1204704/G0202) 国家社会科学基金项目(16BJY070) 河南省高等学校哲学社会科学优秀学者基金项目(2014-YXXZ-17)
【分类号】：F273.1
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，本文编号：2527855
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