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中国电信产业管制机构与反垄断机构的协调机制研究

发布时间:2018-01-10 11:30

  本文关键词:中国电信产业管制机构与反垄断机构的协调机制研究 出处:《浙江财经大学》2015年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


  更多相关文章: 电信产业 管制机构 反垄断机构 协调机制


【摘要】:电信产业的健康发展既离不开行业管制机构的规范和监督,也离不开反垄断机构对市场竞争秩序的维护,然而两类机构在实际执法中却容易发生冲突。一方面,管制机构为了保证电信产业的规模经济性,维护电信市场的安全秩序,必须适当控制企业的数量,制定严格的市场准入和企业运营标准;反垄断机构则负责维护市场经济的正常竞争秩序,尽可能地减少遏制竞争的行为。出发点的不同导致两类机构决策主张的差异,有时甚至会对同一市场行为给出截然相反的判定,这便容易引起两类机构间的矛盾和冲突。另一方面,我国管制机构与反垄断机构在处理电信产业的竞争问题时,存在法律规定不明确、权责定位不清晰等现象,使两类机构间的冲突加剧。此外,随着电信产业市场程度的不断提高,反垄断机构对电信产业的干预将逐渐增加,两类机构在电信产业执法中的交叉领域也将增加,如果不能在管制机构与反垄断机构间建立有效的协调机制,那么在机构建设和法律法规不完善的情况下,两类机构间的矛盾将不断凸显。 鉴于以上原因,本文研究了中国电信产业管制机构与反垄断机构的协调问题,以期建立完善的协调机制,,提高两类机构的整体效率,促进电信产业市场化改革和政府职能转变的顺利进行。 具体来讲,本文首先对电信产业的经济特征、管制与反垄断机构的相关理论以及行业法规与《反垄断法》执法优先权的学者观点进行综述。其次,对两类机构的权力配置现状与冲突加以分析,并深入探讨了冲突产生的制度性原因。同时,结合我国电信产业的发展现状,对两类机构的权利配置模式进行了比较选择。在此基础上,本文借鉴库珀—约翰协调博弈的基本模型,构建了一个两类机构的协调博弈模型,对直接影响协调成功的策略互补性进行了描述,分析了协调失败的原因及其改进方法,并在此基础上得出了加强策略互补性的动力机制。最后,针对机构间冲突的根源,结合协调博弈的分析结果,提出了建立两类机构协调机制的政策思路,主要有一下四个方面:完善法律制度;明确两类机构的职能定位;建立两类机构间协调的激励制度;形成信息沟通和互相监督机制。 本文可能在以下几个方面有所创新: 1.基于产业运行效率的新视角对两类机构的权力配置模式进行选择。本文在对两类机构权力配置模式的比较选择中,除了从产业发展和政策导向的角度进行探讨,还对目前电信企业的运行效率进行了简单的实证分析,并以实证结果为依据,从效率改进的角度进一步对权力配置模式进行选择论证,丰富了研究方法和研究内容。 2.应用协调博弈理论应用分析两类机构的协调问题。以往管制机构与反垄断机构的协调研究中,更多是通过案例和经验分析进行政策设计,本文将政策设计的基础建立在博弈分析的结果上,使得出的结论更加具有说服力和应用性。同时,本文根据冲突现状分析,在已有的库珀—约翰协调博弈模型的基础上,构建了一个两类机构的协调博弈模型,并引入策略互补性的概念探讨我国电信产业两类机构的协调机制。 3.初步构建了多视角的两类机构协调机制。以往的研究往往只提出较为片面单一的协调措施,没有从整体协调过程给出全面的合理建议。本文从多个视角为机构协调提出明确且可行的一系列措施,更加具有针对性和实用性,有助于实现两类机构的协调运行,减少综合效率的损失。
[Abstract]:The healthy development of the telecommunications industry not only cannot do without the regulation of the industry norms and supervision mechanism, also cannot do without the maintenance of antitrust authorities on the market competition order, however, the two types of institutions are easily in the actual enforcement of conflict. On the one hand, the control mechanism in order to guarantee the economy scale of telecommunication industry, the maintenance of security and order of telecom market the number of enterprises must, appropriate control, strict market access and operating standards; anti monopoly agency is responsible for the maintenance of the normal order of market economy competition, reducing as far as possible to curb competition. The starting point of the different causes the differences between the two types of decision-making bodies argued, sometimes even in the same market behavior are opposite the judge, it is easy to cause the contradictions and conflicts between the two institutions. On the other hand, China's regulatory agencies and the antitrust authorities in the competition problem of telecom industry, existence The law is not clear responsibilities, localization is not clear, the conflict between the two institutions increased. In addition, with the continuous improvement of the level of telecom market, antitrust intervention in the telecommunications industry will gradually increase, the two types of institutions in the field of telecommunications industry cross law enforcement will also increase, if the establishment of coordination mechanism not in the effective regulatory agencies and antitrust authorities, so in the construction sector and the laws and regulations are not perfect, the contradiction between the two institutions will continue to highlight.
In view of the above reasons, this paper studies the coordination between China Telecom's industrial control institutions and antitrust institutions, with a view to establish a sound coordination mechanism, improve the overall efficiency of the two kinds of institutions, and promote the smooth implementation of the marketization reform of the telecommunications industry and the transformation of government functions.
Specifically, firstly, economic characteristics of the telecommunication industry, summarizes the relevant theories of regulation and antitrust agencies and industry regulations and "anti-monopoly law enforcement priority > scholars'views. Secondly, the status quo and conflict of power allocation on the two types of institutions are analyzed, and the discussion of the institutional causes of conflict. At the same time, combined with the current development of China's telecom industry, rights allocation mode of two types of institutions were compared. On this basis, this paper from the basic model of Cooper - John coordination game, constructs a game model of coordination of two types of institutions, directly affect the success of the coordination of Strategic Complementarities are described. Analysis of the causes of coordination failure and its improvement method, and based on the dynamic mechanism of strengthening the complementary strategy. Finally, aiming at the root cause of the conflict between institutions, combined with the coordination game Based on the results, we put forward the policy thinking of establishing two kinds of agency coordination mechanism. There are mainly four aspects: improving the legal system, defining the function orientation of the two kinds of institutions, establishing the incentive system of two kinds of inter agency coordination, forming information communication and mutual supervision mechanism.
This article may be innovative in the following aspects:
1. new perspective of industrial efficiency based on power allocation model of two types of institutions were selected. Based on the comparison and selection of two kinds of organization power allocation mode, apart from the industrial development and policy oriented perspectives on the present operating efficiency of telecom enterprise makes a simple empirical analysis, and empirical results on the basis of efficiency improvement from the angle of further power allocation mode selection demonstration, enrich the research methods and research content.
The application of game theory to analyze the coordination problem of two types of institutions to coordinate 2.. Previous research coordination regulatory agencies and antitrust agencies in more cases and through the empirical analysis of policy design, this paper will base policy design based on the results of the game analysis, the conclusion is more convincing and application. At the same time in this paper, according to the analysis of the current situation of conflict, based on existing Cooper John coordination game model, constructing a game model of a class two coordination mechanism, and the introduction of the concept of strategic complementarity and coordination mechanism of China telecom industry two types of institutions.
3. constructs a coordination mechanism of two types of institutions and multi perspective. Previous studies often suggested only one-sided single coordination measures, no coordination suggestions from the whole process are given. In this paper, from the angle of institutional coordination and put forward a series of measures clear and feasible, more targeted and practical, help to realize the coordinated operation of the two types of institutions, reduce the loss of efficiency.

【学位授予单位】:浙江财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:D922.294;F626

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