风险投资对中小板上市公司非效率投资影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-04 20:15

本文关键词：风险投资对中小板上市公司非效率投资影响的实证研究　出处：《西南财经大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：风险投资在20世纪六七十年代起源于美国,随着互联网的兴起,风险投资在发达国家和地区迅速的扩张,成为了新一轮科技革命的助推剂。风险投资机构的创立促进了具有市场潜力的高科技企业的生存与发展,推动中小企业创业初期的技术创新与产业结构升级。随着2004年中小板的创立和2009年创业板的成功推出,我国资本市场给风险投资行业发展带来了新的机遇,风险投资成为了我国创新高科技企业的孵化器。它不仅作为一种权益性资金注入创业企业,而且参与企业经营决策、提供专业化的服务,在创业企业后续的人事聘用、技术发展、销售增长、价值增加等方面扮演着重要的角色。风险投资利用其专业的知识背景,对需要资金的创业企业进行评估筛选,再将资金投向创业企业,经过创业企业家的经营管理,资本增值后流回投资,最后风险投资将获得的收益分配给投资人,从而周而复始的循环资本。此外,风险投资通过金融契约、分段投资、介入董事会、更换管理层等方式参与被投资公司治理。风险投资之所以能对公司治理产生直接的作用,最关键在于董事会作为公司治理机制的核心,风险投资在被投资企业董事会中占有席位,而且保持有对重大经营决策的一票表决权,从而能对被投资企业进行监控和管理。另外,风险投资既具备法律、财务、管理方面的专业才能,又对某些领域具有特定专业知识和投资经验。不少研究表明风险投资对上市公司具有监督作用,风险投资会通过各种方式来监督上市公司以控制其投机行为。风险投资资金是权益性资金,会使被投资公司的债务风险相应降低,被投资公司自身的成长能力也会因为风险投资的介入而得到市场的认可,为企业后续融资提供了便利。除此之外,风险投资通常与投资银行家、基金、券商等投资者有密切的联系,风险投资利用自己的资源网络,可以帮助企业引来更多的资金。因此,从理论来看,风险投资不仅可以发挥监督职能减少代理问题,而且可作为第三方发挥认证效应,降低风险企业与投资者的信息不对称,并利用自身的社会资源为被投资企业吸引更多的资金。从国内外研究文献发现,近年来对风险投资与非效率投资各自相关研究已十分深入,而关于风险投资对公司投资效率方面的研究较少,本文试图探索风险投资能否对公司非效率投资产生影响? 本文在选择样本时,考虑到风险投资的投资对象主要是高成长潜力又具有较大风险的中小型创业企业,而深交所中小板和创业板上市公司正是为中小企业提供融资的平台,但鉴于创业板2009年才推出,能满足本文要求的上市公司样本很少,因此,本文只选取了在2010年12月31日之前在中小板上市的328家公司作为研究样本,并没有将创业板作为考察对象。为了证实风险投资对过度投资和投资不足的影响。本文首先回顾了国内外关于风险投资和非效率投资的相关文献,并介绍了风险投资对公司非效率投资影响的主要理论和作用机制。然后结合国内外理论分析和作用机制提出了本文的假设,并对假设进行了实证检验。最后提出了文章的结论,并根据结论提出政策建议。基于以上逻辑思路,全文共划分为6个部分,具体安排如下：第一部分为诸论。这一部分主要介绍文章的研究背景和意义、研究方法、研究思路和文章结构。第二部分是相关文献回顾。主要是对风险投资和非效率投资方面的相关文献进行了回顾,并对风险投资与公司非效率投资的关系进行了评述。第三部分是对我国风险投资对公司非效率投资影响的理论分析。这部分内容首先基于“信息不对称理论”、“风险投资契约理论”和“认证理论”展开阐述,为后文分析风险投资对非效率投资的影响奠定理论基础；然后,对风险投资和非效率投资的概念进行了界定；最后,介绍了风险投资的基本运作模式,并总结了风险投资对公司非效率投资的治理机制。主要从内部公司治理角度和外部融资环境作用角度分别介绍了风险投资介入公司治理后的治理机制。其中,内部治理机制主要是论述对被投资企业的过度投资进行监控,可能抑制过度投资,而外部融资环境的作用机制主要是对被投资企业的融资环境进行优化,可能使投资不足得到缓解。第四部分是研究设计。首先是根据前面部分提出的理论分析,提出了本文的四个假设：(1)风险投资具有良好的监控作用,有风险投资介入的公司比没有风险投资介入的公司更能抑制过度投资；风险投资具有认证作用和社会网络,有风险投资介入的公司比没有风险投资介入的公司更能缓解投资不足。(2)存在过度投资的公司中,风险投资持股比例与过度投资负相关；存在投资不足的公司中,风险投资持股比例与投资不足负相关。(3)存在过度投资的公司中,风险投资机构数量与过度投资负相关；在投资不足的公司中,风险投资机构数量投资不足负相关。(4)在政府背景、民营背景、外资背景、混合型背景四种背景中,政府背景风险投资由于管理人员任命模式等原因,使其对被投资公司监控作用较弱,从而对过度投资的抑制作用较小。但风险投资能利用政治关系等资源,更能容易地缓解被投资企业的投资不足。然后进行模型的设计以及变量的定义。第五部分是实证检验与分析。首先,对预期投资模型的变量进行了描述性统计,并对各变量进行相关性检验,计算出预期投资水平；然后,是风险投资与过度投资和投资不足进行的实证分析。分别从风险投资是否介入、风险投资的持股比例、风险投资机构数量以及不同的风险投资背景来分析与非效率投资的影响。第六部分是文章的研究结论、政策建议和展望。通过实证检验,得出的研究结论。本文通过回归分析对假设进行了实证检验,得出以下结论：(1)风险投资机构介入被投资企业与非效率投资(过度投资和投资不足)显著负相关。(2)风险投资持股比例与过度投资不存在显著相关性,与投资不足呈现显著负相关。(3)风险投资数量与非效率投资(过度投资和投资不足)显著负相关。(4)风险投资的四种背景中,民营背景、混合型背景与过度投资行为显著负相关；政府背景与投资不足显著负相关,其他背景与非效率投资没有显著的相关性。本部分在总结全文的基础上,结合实证分析结果,分别人才培养、风投管理模式、联合投资、资金引导方面提出有针对性的建议和政策：(1)加强风险投资机构的人才培养。(2)改善国有背景风险投资的管理模式。(3)加强国内外风险投资机构之间的协作。(4)积极引导社会资金进入风险投资机构。本文的拟创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面：首先,非效率投资的相关研究成果主要在代理问题、融资约束、自由现金流等方面,很少从风险投资的角度研究对公司非效率投资的影响。本文主要基于风险投资能够克服逆向选择、克服道德风险、发挥认证效应作为切入点,从公司内部治理和外部融资环境优化的角度,分析风险投资对公司非效率投资影响的可能性。其次,在模型建立方面,选用Richardson(2006)的投资模型衡量非效率投资的程度,考虑到我国资本市场有效性的影响,用托宾Q值作为代理变量会导致成长性测量的偏差。同时,考虑到股权分置改革及存在限售股对托宾Q值计算的影响,因此,本文采用销售收入增长率作为成长机会的替代变量。最后,本文将风险投资背景细分为了政府背景、民营背景、外资背景、混合型背景,来分析不同的背景对过度投资和投资不足的影响差异。
[Abstract]:The risk of investment in twentieth Century 60s and 70s originated in the United States, with the rise of the Internet, the expansion of investment risk in developed countries and regions rapidly, has become a booster of a new round of technological revolution. The creation of venture capital institutions to promote the survival and development of the market potential of the high-tech enterprises, promote technological innovation and industrial upgrading of small and medium-sized enterprises in the early days.
Founded in 2004 with small board and gem in 2009 the successful launch of China's capital market for venture capital industry development has brought new opportunities and risks of the incubator of our innovative high-tech enterprises become the investment. It not only as an equity funds into the enterprise, and participate in the management of enterprises, to provide professional in the follow-up service, enterprise personnel, technology development, sales growth, value increase and play an important role.
The risk of investment by their professional knowledge background, evaluated in need of funding for start-ups, the funds to invest in venture enterprises, through the management of entrepreneurs, to invest capital gains, income distribution risk investment will be the last to investors, so the cycle of capital circulation. In addition, the risk of investment through financial contracts. In the board of directors, staged investment, change of management and other ways to participate in corporate governance. Investment risk investment is can have a direct effect on corporate governance, the key lies in the core of the board of directors of the corporate governance mechanism, risk investment in the invested enterprise board seats, and keep on major business decisions one vote right, so as to enable the invested enterprise monitoring and management. In addition, venture capital has legal, financial, management and professional talents, and There are specific expertise and investment experience in some areas. Many studies show that venture capital has a supervisory function on listed companies. Venture capital will supervise listed companies in various ways to control their speculation.
Venture capital is equity capital, will make the investment firm's debt risk is reduced accordingly, investment in the company's own growth ability will be recognized by the market because of the risks involved in investing, providing convenience for subsequent financing enterprises. In addition, the risk of investment and investment bankers, fund, close contact the brokerage and venture capital investors, using their own resources network, can help enterprises to attract more capital.
Therefore, from the theoretical point of view, the risk of investment can not only play a supervisory function to reduce the agency problem, but also can play as the third party certification effect, reduce the risk of asymmetric information of enterprises and investors, and the use of their own social resources for the invested enterprises to attract more funds. From domestic and foreign research literature in recent years, research on risk investment with their non efficiency investment has been very thorough, but the research on risk investment on investment efficiency is less, this paper attempts to explore the risk investment will affect the company's non efficiency investment?
Based on the selection of samples, taking into account the risk investment object is mainly small and medium sized enterprise high growth potential and higher risk, and the Shenzhen SME board and GEM listed companies is to provide financing platform for small and medium-sized enterprises, but in view of the gem was launched in 2009, this paper can meet the requirements of the listed companies rarely, therefore, this paper only chooses 328 companies before December 31, 2010 in the small board listed as the research sample, and not the gem as the object of study.
In order to confirm the effects of risk investment on excessive investment and insufficient. This paper reviews the related literature on risk investment and inefficient investment at home and abroad, and introduces the main theory and the mechanism of the impact of venture capital on non efficiency investment. Then combined with the analysis and mechanism of domestic and international theory put forward the hypothesis, and for hypothesis test. Finally, the conclusion of this paper, and put forward policy recommendations according to the conclusions above. Based on logical thinking, this paper is divided into 6 parts, as follows:
The first part is the various theories. This part mainly introduces the background and significance of the research, the research methods, the research ideas and the structure of the article.
The second part is related literature review. It reviews the literature on venture capital and inefficient investment, and reviews the relationship between venture capital and inefficient investment.
The third part is to analyze the influence of risk investment in China on non efficiency investment theory. This part firstly based on "information asymmetry theory", "contract theory" and "risk investment authentication theory" are discussed, which lays the theoretical foundation for the analysis of the impact of venture capital on non efficiency investment; then, the concept of risk investment and inefficient investment are defined; finally, introduces the basic operation mode of venture capital, and summarizes the governance mechanism of venture investment on non efficiency investment. The main function of company governance from the internal and external financing environment angle angle introduces risk investment after intervention in corporate governance governance mechanism. Among them, the main the internal governance mechanism is discussed for the monitoring of the over investment by investment companies, may inhibit the excessive investment, while the mechanism of external financing environment is mainly to be The optimization of the financing environment of the investment enterprises may alleviate the shortage of investment.
The fourth part is the research design. Based on the analysis of the front part of the proposed theory, put forward four hypotheses: (1) venture capital has the good effect of monitoring, risk investment companies to curb excessive investment more than no risk investment company; risk investment with authentication function and social network, have risk investment companies can alleviate the lack of investment more than no risk investment company. (2) there is over investment companies, venture capital holdings and over investment are negatively correlated; there is insufficient investment in the company, the problem of venture capital holdings and investment negative correlation. (3) the existence of excessive investment company in the number of venture capital institutions and over investment are negatively correlated; in the lack of investment in the company, lack of risk investment institutions to invest in a number of negative correlation. (4) in the background of government, private background, foreign capital back King, mixed background of four kinds of background, the government investment risk management personnel appointed as background model, the investee company monitoring effect is weak, so as to inhibit the excessive investment is small. But the risk investment can use political relations and other resources, can more easily alleviate the shortage of the invested enterprise and investment. The design model and the definition of the variable.
The fifth part is the empirical test and analysis. Firstly, the expected investment model variables were analyzed by descriptive statistics, and test the correlation of variables, calculate the expected level of investment; then, risk investment and empirical overinvestment and underinvestment analysis. Respectively from the risk investment is involved, the shareholding ratio of risk investment the number of venture capital institutions and different background to analyze the impact of venture capital investment and non efficiency.
The sixth part is the research conclusion, policy suggestion and prospect. Through the empirical analysis, the conclusions of this study. This paper makes an empirical test on the hypothesis by regression analysis, draw the following conclusions: (1) in the invested enterprise and non efficiency investment risk investment institutions (overinvestment and underinvestment) a significant negative correlation (2.) venture capital holdings and excessive investment has no significant correlation, showed a significant negative correlation with the lack of investment. (3) the amount of investment and non efficiency investment risk (overinvestment and underinvestment) a significant negative correlation. (4) four private background of venture capital in the background, mixed background and significant over investment behavior negative correlation; government background and the lack of investment had a significant negative correlation, no significant correlation between other background and non efficiency investment. This part is on the basis of summing up, combined with the results of empirical analysis, respectively, personnel training, Venture capital management, joint investment funds, guidance and put forward some suggestions and policies: (1) strengthen risk investment institutions in personnel training. (2) improve the state-owned background of venture capital management. (3) to strengthen cooperation between domestic and foreign venture capital institutions. (4) actively guide social capital into the venture investment institutions.
The innovation of this article is mainly embodied in the following aspects:
First of all, the relevant research results of the non efficiency investment mainly in the agency problem, financing constraints, free cash flow, impact on non efficiency investment research from the perspective of venture capital. This paper is mainly based on the investment risk is rarely able to overcome adverse selection, overcome the moral risk, play the certification effect as a starting point, from the company's internal governance and optimize the environment of external financing point of view, the possibility analysis of the impact of venture capital on non efficiency investment.
Secondly, to establish the model, using Richardson (2006) investment model to measure the efficiency of investment, taking into account the impact of the effectiveness of China's capital market, as a proxy for growth will lead to the deviation of measurement with the Tobin Q value. At the same time, taking into account the equity division reform and the existence of restricted stock value calculation the influence of Tobin Q, therefore, the growth rate of sales income as the proxy of growth opportunities.
Finally, the background of venture capital is subdivided into government background, private background, foreign capital background and mixed background, to analyze the influence of different backgrounds on overinvestment and underinvestment.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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