资本市场的绩效压力与企业投资不足——股权制衡和两职兼任的调节作用

发布时间：2018-01-28 13:15

本文关键词： 绩效压力投资不足股权制衡两职分离　出处：《山西财经大学学报》2014年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：以我国2007~2012年A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,对资本市场的绩效压力与企业投资不足之间的关系进行了理论探讨和实证验证。研究结果表明:资本市场的绩效压力越大,经理人为了满足资本市场绩效预期,越倾向于放弃良好的投资机会,从而导致企业投资不足的可能性和程度都有所提高;相对于股权制衡度低、总经理和董事长两职分离的公司而言,在股权制衡度高、总经理和董事长两职兼任的公司中,资本市场的绩效压力对企业投资不足影响的可能性和程度均有所降低。
[Abstract]:From 2007 to 2012, A share manufacturing listed companies in China are taken as the research samples. The relationship between the performance pressure of the capital market and the underinvestment of the enterprise is discussed theoretically and empirically. The results show that the greater the performance pressure of the capital market, the more the managers meet the performance expectations of the capital market. The higher the tendency to give up good investment opportunities, the higher the possibility and degree of underinvestment; Relative to the low degree of equity checks and balances, the separation of the general manager and the chairman of the company, in the high degree of equity checks and balances, general manager and chairman of both positions of the company. The performance pressure of capital market has reduced the possibility and degree of the influence of underinvestment.
【作者单位】：上海财经大学国际工商管理学院;上海财经大学现代服务经济研究院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年资助项目(12CGL121) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(Y6110042) 上海财经大学研究生科研创新基金资助项目(CXJJ-2012-349)
【分类号】：F832.51;F224
【正文快照】： 一、引言投资是企业资源配置的一种重要方式,而有效投资既是企业成长的重要动因,又是增加企业价值的重要途径。然而,由于公司治理机制不完善和信息不对称产生的市场噪音,使企业投资容易偏离最优投资水平,导致企业投资无效率(Bushman和Smith,2001;Alti,2003;Biddle等,2009;Bush

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