房地产政策执行过程中地方政府行为研究
本文关键词: 房地产政策 地方政府 政策执行 出处:《广东海洋大学》2013年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:房地产产业是我国国民经济的重要产业,也是地方经济增长和财政收入增加的重要来源,随着商品经济的发展和城市化进程的加快,商品房逐渐成为城市居民住宅供应的基本形式,,房价过高会抑制公民的房屋消费,影响公民的幸福指数,与政府的公共服务理念相背离。2004年起,我国政府出台了一系列的调控房地产业的政策,以抑制房价过高和房产投机行为、促进房地产业的健康发展。伴随着中央向地方的纵向权力结构的调整和房地产产业利益多元化格局的形成,房地产政策在执行过程中的问题也越来越多,在房地产执行过程中常出现政策偏差、执行效率低下等问题,地方政府非合作博弈现象明显。 本文创新性地以地方政府在房地产政策执行过程中的非合作博弈行为为研究对象,从公共政策学、新制度经济学和地方政府学的视角,通过文献分析法、实证分析法和综合分析法的综合应用,在总结房地产政策执行过程中互动理论模型的基础上,对地方政府的政策执行行为进行动态分析,力求构造一个相对系统的分析维度来探寻地方政府房地产政策执行过程中非理性博弈的原因所在,归纳出一个有助于规范地方政府房地产政策执行行为的有效路径。 通过理论分析与实证分析的结合,可以看出,地方政府在房地产政策执行过程中的诸多执行困境和非理性博弈行为,除了源于纵向府际间的利益冲突情境下地方政府的应付,还受横向地方政府间竞争情境下创新性政策执行行为的影响,进而系统分析两种府际关系下,地方政府非合作博弈行为特征、表现形式和制度原因。并从房地产业调控体系、地方政府政策执行力和规范政策执行行为的制度建设等方面提出规范地方政府执行房地产公共政策行为的对策。 本文主要包括6个部分:第一章导论部分,主要阐释选题目的和意义、国内外相关研究综述及本文研究的研究方法。第二章,将对房地产公共政策的基本概念和特征进行界定,并从房地产政策的变迁的视角,简要分析房地产政策的执行困境。第三章着重分析房地产公共政策执行过程中的利益相关者,并构建当代中国地方政府房地产政策执行行为的理论模型。第四章和第五章将从博弈论的视角,结合案例对利益冲突情境和竞争情境下地方政府的房地产政策执行行为的特点、表现形式和深层制度原因等方面的影响进行分析。第六章以优化地方政府政策执行力为宗旨,提出规范房地产政策实施过程中地方政府执行行为的主要策略,从而提升地方政府的政策执行力,促进我国房地产市场的健康、持续发展。
[Abstract]:Real estate industry is an important industry of our national economy, and also an important source of local economic growth and fiscal revenue increase. With the development of commodity economy and the acceleration of urbanization process. Commercial housing has gradually become the basic form of housing supply for urban residents. Excessive housing prices will restrain citizens' housing consumption, affect citizens' happiness index, and deviate from the government's concept of public service. 2004. Our government has issued a series of policies to control the real estate industry in order to curb the excessive housing prices and property speculation. Promote the healthy development of real estate industry. With the adjustment of vertical power structure from central to local and the formation of diversification of real estate industry interests, real estate policy in the process of implementation of more and more problems. In the process of real estate implementation, there are often some problems, such as policy deviation and inefficient execution, and local governments' non-cooperative game phenomenon is obvious. This paper takes the non-cooperative game behavior of local government in the process of real estate policy implementation as the research object, from the perspective of public policy, new institutional economics and local government, through the literature analysis. The comprehensive application of empirical analysis and comprehensive analysis, on the basis of summarizing the interactive theoretical model in the process of real estate policy implementation, the dynamic analysis of the policy implementation behavior of local governments is carried out. Try to construct a relatively systematic analysis dimension to explore the local government real estate policy implementation process of irrational game reasons. To sum up an effective path to standardize the implementation of local government real estate policy. Through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, we can see that the local government in the implementation of real estate policy implementation of a lot of difficulties and irrational game behavior. In addition to the vertical inter-government conflict of interest situation local government coping, but also by horizontal local government competition in the context of innovative policy implementation behavior, and then systematic analysis of the two types of inter-government relations. Local government non-cooperative game behavior characteristics, manifestations and institutional reasons, and from the real estate control system. This paper puts forward the countermeasures of standardizing the public policy behavior of real estate in the aspects of the local government's policy enforcement ability and the system construction of standardizing the policy enforcement behavior. This paper mainly includes six parts: the first chapter of the introduction, mainly explains the purpose and significance of the topic, domestic and foreign related research review and research methods of this paper. Chapter two. It will define the basic concept and characteristics of the real estate public policy, and from the perspective of the change of the real estate policy. The third chapter focuses on the analysis of the stakeholders in the process of the implementation of public real estate policies. And build the contemporary Chinese local government real estate policy implementation of the theoretical model. 4th and 5th chapters from the perspective of game theory. Combined with the case of conflict of interest situation and competition situation of the local government's real estate policy implementation behavior characteristics. Chapter 6th aims at optimizing the executive power of local government policies and puts forward the main strategies of standardizing the implementation of real estate policies. In order to enhance the local government's policy implementation, promote the healthy and sustainable development of our real estate market.
【学位授予单位】:广东海洋大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F299.23;D630
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 谢庆奎;中国政府的府际关系研究[J];北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版);2000年01期
2 张大维;段江平;;我国房地产调控的央地落差与终极政策效用[J];上海城市管理;2011年04期
3 潘松挺;金桂生;李孝将;;政策网络的结构与治理:以我国房地产宏观调控政策为例[J];城市发展研究;2011年03期
4 陈万翔;陈宇峰;;从相容性视角看房地产政策异化[J];城市开发;2006年12期
5 孙磊;;非均衡的房地产市场与宏观调控[J];中国房地产;2006年12期
6 丁煌;发展中的中国政策科学——我国公共政策学科发展的回眸与展望[J];管理世界;2003年02期
7 朱仁友;;国家宏观调控下促进广西房地产业持续健康发展的思路[J];广西大学学报(哲学社会科学版);2005年06期
8 孙友祥;朱燕;;从政策效率看政策供给路径的完善-我国房地产新政的经济学解读[J];湖北经济学院学报(人文社会科学版);2006年09期
9 易志斌;;地方政府竞争的博弈行为与流域水环境保护[J];经济问题;2011年01期
10 廖俊平;罗党论;;房地产的政策研讨、学术研究与学科建设——2009中国房地产学术研讨会综述[J];经济研究;2009年09期
相关硕士学位论文 前3条
1 马浙宾;城市房地产政策与制度建设研究[D];上海交通大学;2007年
2 韩永军;基于博弈论视野的我国房地产公共政策执行问题研究[D];华中师范大学;2009年
3 曾睿;中国房地产调控政策绩效研究[D];江西财经大学;2012年
本文编号:1481983
本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/zbyz/1481983.html