关系型借贷与社会信用体系的构建——基于小微企业演化博弈的视角

发布时间：2018-02-20 04:38

本文关键词： 小微企业关系型借贷道德风险信用体系演化博弈　出处：《财经研究》2014年12期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：文章以小微企业的"硬信息"不可获得性和企业主的自然人属性为背景,从小微企业主的道德伦理出发,运用阿马蒂亚·森的确保原则将银行面临的道德风险转化为两类企业不确定性的类型风险,并借助博弈分析模型研究关系型借贷对企业贷款行为模式的影响。研究发现:(1)欺诈企业的存在会导致整个信贷市场的恶化;(2)在引入了银行贷款策略选择和企业声誉机制后,关系型借贷由于在一定程度上解决了信息不对称问题而实现了信贷合约的自我实施,并将促使"欺诈"企业向"诚信"企业演化,从而提高社会整体信用水平。文章的博弈分析结论还得到了浙江省台州市三家"城商行"的经验数据的支持。文章将道德伦理的因素重新引入经济系统的研究中,发现关系型借贷对营造良好的社会信用体系具有重要的价值。
[Abstract]:Based on the background of "hard information" of small and micro enterprises and the nature of natural person of business owners, this paper starts from the moral ethics of small and micro enterprises. And using Amartya Sen's principles of assurance, the moral hazard that banks face is translated into two types of corporate uncertainty. By using the game analysis model, the paper studies the influence of relational lending on enterprise loan behavior. It is found that the existence of "1 / 1" fraud will lead to the deterioration of the whole credit market. (2) after introducing the bank loan strategy choice and corporate reputation mechanism, Relational lending, to a certain extent, solves the problem of information asymmetry and realizes the self-implementation of credit contracts, which will promote the evolution of "fraud" enterprises to "good faith" enterprises. In order to improve the credit level of the society as a whole, the conclusion of the game analysis is supported by the empirical data of the three "City Merchants" in Taizhou City, Zhejiang Province. The article reintroduces the moral and ethical factors into the study of the economic system. It is found that relational lending plays an important role in creating a good social credit system.
【作者单位】：上海财经大学金融学院;
【基金】：上海市哲学社会科学规划项目(2014BJB008)
【分类号】：F276.3;F832.4

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