基于博弈分析的我国房地产调控失效及治理研究

发布时间：2018-03-09 23:04

本文选题：房地产调控　切入点：治理　出处：《中南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国的房地产市场在近些年的发展中取得了惊人成就,也出现了一系列亟待解决的问题。中央政府的房地产调控随市场环境的变换而不断完善,呈现出目标多维化、工具多样化、政策力度日益加大的趋势。2011年以前,房价甚至在房地产调控力度加大的情况下持续上涨,2011年下半年以来,虽然调控取得了一定效果,但其持续性和稳定性有待加强。我国房地产调控存在的主要问题在于政策执行过程中的失效,而不在于政策供给或者调控力度的不足。所以,解决调控政策执行中存在的失效问题才是从根本上解决房地产市场诸多问题的当务之急。从寻找调控失效的根源出发,将我国房地产调控政策执行过程中所涉及的主要利益群体置于利益机制之下进行分析,探索各个利益群体在房地产调控中所处的环境和地位,以及各自的角色和行为,并对主体在不同约束条件下的行为特征,以及这些行为特征对调控效果的影响进行分析。分析认为,地方政府在激励监督机制不完善和分权体制下与中央政府因利益冲突而产生的利益博弈；开发商在市场信息不对称下对地方政府的寻租及与消费者的房价博弈；以及在非理性预期下,消费者之间的购房博弈是导致我国房地产调控失效的主要原因。针对我国房地产调控失效的三个主要原因,分别运用经典博弈、期权博弈和行为博弈的理论工具,建立不同约束条件下的博弈治理模型,从博弈模型的建立和均衡分析来看,如何对地方政府进行有效的激励和约束,对开发商进行有效监督,对消费者进行合理引导,是治理由主体行为导致调控失效的重点。最后从模型分析的结论出发,寻求加强房地产调控效果的主体行为治理对策,认为只有制定行之有效的激励约束机制,健全监督机制,完善房地产市场机制,并对消费者进行有效引导,才能在一定程度上规避房地产调控的失效,从而促进房地产市场的健康发展。
[Abstract]:The real estate market of our country has made remarkable achievements in recent years, and a series of problems need to be solved urgently. The real estate regulation and control of the central government has been improved with the change of the market environment. The trend of diversification of tools and increasing policy intensity. Before 2011, house prices continued to rise even under the condition of increased real estate regulation and control. Since the second half of 2011, although the control has achieved certain results, However, its sustainability and stability need to be strengthened. The main problem of real estate regulation in China lies in the failure of the policy implementation process, not in the insufficient supply or regulation of the policy. It is urgent to solve many problems in real estate market to solve the problem of failure in the implementation of regulation and control policy. In order to find out the root of the regulation and control failure, this paper analyzes the main interest groups involved in the implementation of the real estate regulation and control policy in our country under the interest mechanism, and explores the environment and status of the various interest groups in the real estate regulation and control. And their respective roles and behaviors, and the behavior characteristics of the subject under different constraint conditions, as well as the influence of these behavioral characteristics on the regulatory effect. The interest game between the local government and the central government under the imperfect mechanism of incentive and supervision and the decentralization system, the rent-seeking of the local government under the asymmetric market information and the game between the local government and the consumer's house price, and the interest conflict between the local government and the central government under the system of incentive supervision and decentralization; And under the irrational expectation, the main reason of the failure of real estate regulation and control in our country is the game of buying house among consumers. Aiming at the three main reasons of the invalidation of real estate regulation in our country, we use the theory tools of classical game, option game and behavior game respectively to establish the game governance model under different constraint conditions, and from the point of view of the establishment and equilibrium analysis of the game model. How to effectively encourage and restrain the local government, supervise the developers effectively, and guide the consumers reasonably is the key point of governance, which leads to the failure of regulation and control by the subject behavior. Finally, the conclusion of the model analysis begins with the conclusion of the model analysis. In order to improve the effect of real estate regulation and control, we should establish effective incentive and restraint mechanism, perfect supervision mechanism, perfect real estate market mechanism, and guide consumers effectively. In order to avoid the failure of real estate regulation to a certain extent, thus promoting the healthy development of the real estate market.
【学位授予单位】：中南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F299.23;F224.32

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