上市公司董事会监管下CEO变更对盈余管理的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-20 00:39

本文选题：董事会监管　切入点：高管变更　出处：《湖南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来，随着我国证券市场规模越来越大，国内上市公司高管人员变更的大量发生，越来越受到债权人、股东等利益相关者的关注。高管变更是公司内外部共同治理的结果，能够识别并撤换业绩不佳的高管被视为公司治理机制有效与否的重要标识之一。同时多数上市公司无论出于什么动机，都无法避免地从事盈余管理行为。作为公司管理的一部分，盈余管理行为很大程度是上市公司高管人员权衡利弊后而做出的选择。同时在新的会计准则颁布后，盈余管理行为愈发成为公司关注的焦点。此外，我国公司内部治理的核心部门董事会是决策公司高管人员变更和盈余管理行为监督关键因素，但是我国上市公司普遍存在着董事会监管机制不完善，导致公司委托代理问题突出，盈余管理问题无法得到抑制。因此，盈余管理已成为国内外研究热点问题。本文根据国泰安数据库中披露的高管变更信息，使用中国上市公司2008-2011年数据，，检验不同公司内部治理结构下高管人员变更带来的盈余管理行为，探索我国上市公司董事会监管，高管变更与盈余管理三者的相关关系，并提出相关建议。第一章对已有的关于盈余管理，高管变更及董事会监管三者关系的文献进行综述；然后第二章阐述高管变更的理论基础，董事会监管的理论基础和盈余管理行为的理论基础并且介绍了董事会监管的四个特征手段、高管变更的机制以及盈余管理的定义、手段和计量方法，为下一章进行机理分析做出铺垫；其次第三章运用规范分析研究了董事会监管对高管变更的影响和高管变更对盈余管理的影响以及董事会监管下高管变更产生的盈余管理行为的影响分析。最后在介绍本文的数据筛选情况后，运用Spss软件，通过多元回归分析和二元Logistic回归分析进行实证分析，检验了本文的研究假设，进一步考察了董事会监管机制对高管变更发生时产生的盈余管理行为的影响，并根据研究结果提出对于规范我国盈余管理治理的对策和建议，主要包括加强盈余管理行为的事后监督，完善董事会结构，加强会计制度建设，为完善上市公司内部治理结构提供补充性的理论依据。实证结果表明：（1)高管变更与盈余管理行为呈负相关关系，说明公司高管人员发生变更的当年有调减利润的行为；（2)董事会监管制度的四个特征手段中，董事会规模小、独立董事比例高以及董事长和总经理两职分离时与盈余管理呈负相关关系，证明这三者对高管变更发生所带来的盈余管理行为起到抑制作用；（3)董事会会议越多、董事长和总经理两职分离与公司高管变更正相关而董事会规模与高管变更呈负相关。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the increasing scale of China's securities market, a large number of changes in senior executives of listed companies in China have been paid more and more attention by creditors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The change of executives is the result of common governance inside and outside the company. The ability to identify and replace underperforming executives is seen as an important indicator of the effectiveness of corporate governance. As a part of company management, earnings management behavior is to a large extent a choice made by executives of listed companies after weighing the pros and cons. At the same time, after the promulgation of the new accounting standards, In addition, the board of directors, the core department of corporate governance, is the key factor of the change of executives and the supervision of earnings management behavior. However, the listed companies in our country generally have imperfect supervision mechanism of the board of directors, which leads to the outstanding problem of principal-agent and the problem of earnings management. Therefore, earnings management has become a hot issue at home and abroad. According to the information of executive change disclosed in Cathay Pacific database, this paper uses the 2008-2011 data of listed companies in China to test the earnings management behavior caused by the change of senior executives in different corporate governance structures. To explore the relationship among board supervision, executive change and earnings management of listed companies in China, and put forward relevant suggestions. Chapter 1 summarizes the existing literature on the relationship among earnings management, executive change and board supervision; Then the second chapter describes the theoretical basis of executive change, the theoretical basis of board of directors supervision and earnings management behavior, and introduces the four characteristic means of board of directors supervision, the mechanism of executive change and the definition of earnings management. Means and measurement methods, for the next chapter for mechanism analysis to make the groundwork; The third chapter uses normative analysis to study the impact of board supervision on executive change, the impact of executive change on earnings management, and the impact of executive change on earnings management behavior under board supervision. After introducing the data filtering in this article, With the help of Spss software, this paper tests the hypothesis of this paper through multiple regression analysis and binary Logistic regression analysis, and further investigates the influence of the board of directors' supervision mechanism on earnings management behavior when executives change. Based on the results of the study, the author puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for regulating the governance of earnings management in China, including strengthening the supervision of earnings management, perfecting the structure of the board of directors, and strengthening the construction of accounting system. To improve the internal governance structure of listed companies to provide complementary theoretical basis. The empirical results show that: 1) there is a negative correlation between executive change and earnings management behavior, which indicates that the board of directors is small among the four characteristic means of the board of directors supervision system. The high proportion of independent directors and the negative correlation between the separation of chairman and general manager and earnings management prove that these three factors play a restraining role in earnings management behavior brought about by the change of executives. The separation of chairman and general manager is positively related to the change of executives, while the size of board of directors is negatively correlated with the change of executives.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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