股权激励、在职消费与企业绩效
发布时间:2018-03-20 10:10
本文选题:股权激励 切入点:在职消费 出处:《石河子大学》2013年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:国内外对公司治理的研究由来已久,学者们从不同视角、利用各种理论进行分析,深入探讨了公司治理问题,认为解决代理问题的关键在于在企业股东和经理人之间建立完备的契约。在我国企业管理者的薪酬激励体制中,货币薪酬、股权激励和在职消费是三个重要的组成部分。其中,货币薪酬、股权激励这两部分信息公开,统计起来较为便利,但是在职消费的费用常常归属于企业“经营费用”和“管理费用”项目中,具有一定的隐蔽性,故货币薪酬和股权激励通常被称为显性薪酬,而在职消费通常被视为隐性薪酬。现有文献多研究的是货币薪酬与企业绩效,且争议较多,出现这种情况的原因很可能是由于抛开了股权激励的研究,而且并没有和视为隐性激励的在职消费联系起来,即有关薪酬对上市企业绩效影响的研究中,将显性薪酬和隐性薪酬两方面结合起来分析讨论二者共同对企业绩效影响的,并不多见。本文正是从这点出发,把在职消费——代表隐性薪酬与股权激励一起作为变量,来分析股权激励和在职消费是如何对企业绩效产生影响效用的。本文通过对股权激励、在职消费对企业绩效的影响进行实证研究,发现了存在在职消费的情况下,股权激励是如何影响上市企业绩效的,从而对我国的企业实施股权激励、制定完备的薪酬激励制度、减少代理成本、改善企业绩效提供一点参考。 本文以我国特殊的经济体制与政治制度为研究背景,以代理理论和激励理论为理论基础,参考了大量有关于股权激励与企业绩效、在职消费与企业绩效的文献,建立了以企业绩效为因变量,以股权激励、在职消费和产权性质为自变量,以企业规模、资产负债率、股权集中程度、企业成长性、行业和年度为控制变量的研究模型,并以2006-2010年度我国沪深股票交易市场A股所有上市公司5283个数据(其中国有上市企业2888个,非国有上市企业2395个)为样本,应用Stata11.0和Excel2003对本文的数据进行处理,并进行了实证检验。本文研究结果表明,在国有上市企业中股权激励与企业绩效不显著,在职消费与企业绩效正相关,对企业绩效的影响作用,股权激励与在职消费呈替代关系;在非国有上市公司中,股权激励与企业绩效正相关,股权激励对高管人员的激励作用明显,在职消费与企业绩效负相关,股权激励能够改善在职消费对企业绩效的负面作用。
[Abstract]:Domestic and foreign research on corporate governance has a long history, scholars from different perspectives, using a variety of theories to analyze, in-depth discussion of corporate governance, It is considered that the key to solve the agency problem lies in establishing a complete contract between the shareholders and managers of the enterprise. In the salary incentive system of the managers in our country, the monetary compensation, the equity incentive and the on-the-job consumption are three important parts. Monetary compensation and equity incentive are two parts of information disclosure, which is convenient to statistics, but the cost of in-service consumption is often attributed to the enterprise "operating expenses" and "management costs" projects, with a certain degree of concealment. Therefore, monetary compensation and equity incentive are usually called explicit compensation, while in-service consumption is usually regarded as implicit compensation. The reason for this is probably due to the fact that the research on equity incentive has not been associated with the in-service consumption, which is regarded as implicit incentive, that is, the research on the effect of compensation on the performance of listed enterprises. It is rare to analyze and discuss the influence of explicit compensation and implicit compensation on corporate performance. From this point of view, this paper takes the in-service consumption-representing implicit compensation and equity incentive as variables. This paper analyzes how equity incentive and on-the-job consumption affect enterprise performance. Through empirical research on the impact of equity incentive and in-service consumption on enterprise performance, we find that there is a case of in-service consumption. How does equity incentive affect the performance of listed enterprises, so as to provide some reference for the implementation of equity incentive, the establishment of a complete compensation incentive system, the reduction of agency costs and the improvement of enterprise performance. This paper takes the special economic and political system as the research background, the agency theory and the incentive theory as the theoretical basis, referring to a large number of literature on equity incentive and enterprise performance, on the job consumption and corporate performance. This paper establishes a research model which takes enterprise performance as dependent variable, equity incentive, in-service consumption and property right as independent variables, enterprise size, asset-liability ratio, equity concentration degree, enterprise growth, industry and year as control variables. Taking 5283 data of all A-share listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2006-2010 (2888 state-owned listed enterprises and 2395 non-state-owned listed enterprises) as samples, Stata11.0 and Excel2003 are used to process the data in this paper. The empirical results show that the equity incentive and corporate performance are not significant in state-owned listed enterprises, while in-service consumption is positively related to corporate performance, and the impact on corporate performance. In non-state-owned listed companies, equity incentive has a positive correlation with enterprise performance, equity incentive has a significant incentive effect on executives, while in-service consumption has negative correlation with corporate performance. Equity incentive can improve the negative effect of on-job consumption on enterprise performance.
【学位授予单位】:石河子大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F275;F832.51
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