基于终极控制人视角关联交易与公司绩效研究

发布时间：2018-04-03 14:17

本文选题：终极控制人　切入点：关联交易　出处：《大连理工大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来中国民营经济正经历着翻天覆地得发展,在取得骄人成绩的同时也伴随着许多亟待解决的现实问题。终极控制人为谋求自身利益利用手中控制权控制上市公司,通过关联交易转移上市公司资源,并最终达到攫取控制权私有收益的目的。关联交易的频繁发生不仅严重损害中小股东的利益,降低了企业在资本市场的诚信和盈利能力。尽管监管机构对关联交易进行监督并加大惩罚力度,但由于终极控制人行为的隐蔽性导致公司治理问题较多且难以从根本上解决。本文选取民营上市公司2007-2011五年数据作为研究对象,从终极控制人的视角实证检验终极控制人的控制权和现金流权与关联交易的关系,并分析终极控制人关联交易行为与公司绩效的关系,最后对如何减少终极控制人关联交易行为提出了相应的建议。本研究运用理论与实证检验结合的方法进行研究。理论研究主要针对民营上市公司终极控制人、关联交易以及公司绩效等相关内容,然后构建回归模型通过实证进行检验,研究结论总结如下： (1)民营上市公司中控制权和现金流权分离的结构占样本整体比例达到64.99%,同时分离结构上市公司关联交易水平明显高于两权非分离上市公司,且两权分离上市公司公司绩效(每股收益)低于两权非分离上市公司。 (2)终极控制人控制权与关联交易水平呈显著正相关关系,现金流权与关联交易水平呈显著负相关关系；且随着两权分离度的增加,终极控制人关联交易逐渐增加；且当终极控制人两权分离度较大时,上市公司绩效与其关联交易规模负相关关系被加强。 (3)实证发现随着关联交易水平的增加,公司每股收益水平随之降低,二者呈显著负相关关系；且在终极控制人现金流权较高的情况下,关联交易水平与两权分离度正相关关系被削弱。 (4)研究发现股权制衡度能够制约终极控制人关联交易行为,从而减少终极控制人对其他股东的侵占行为。因此,上市公司应该引入更多机构投资者或者大股东对终极控制人进行有效制衡,最终提高公司绩效。
[Abstract]:In recent years, China's private economy is experiencing earth-shaking development.The ultimate control controls the listed companies by using the control power to control the listed companies by seeking their own interests, transfers the listed companies' resources through the related party transactions, and finally achieves the purpose of seizing the private income of the control rights.The frequent occurrence of related party transactions not only seriously damages the interests of minority shareholders, but also reduces the integrity and profitability of enterprises in the capital market.Although regulators supervise related party transactions and increase punishment, the covert behavior of ultimate controller leads to more problems of corporate governance and is difficult to solve fundamentally.This paper selects the five year data of private listed companies from 2007-2011 as the research object, and empirically tests the relationship between the ultimate controller's right of control and cash flow right and related party transactions from the perspective of ultimate controller.The relationship between the behavior of the ultimate controller and the performance of the company is analyzed. Finally, the corresponding suggestions on how to reduce the behavior of the ultimate controller are put forward.This research uses the method of combining theory and empirical test to carry on the research.The theoretical research mainly focuses on the ultimate controller, related party transactions and corporate performance of private listed companies, and then constructs a regression model to test it through empirical analysis. The research conclusions are summarized as follows:1) the structure of separation of control and cash flow rights in private listed companies accounts for 64.99 percent of the sample, and the level of related party transactions of listed companies with separate structure is obviously higher than that of non-separate listed companies with two rights.And the company performance (earnings per share) of two separate listed companies is lower than that of non-listed companies.(2) there is a significant positive correlation between the control right of the ultimate controller and the level of the related party transaction, a significant negative correlation between the cash flow right and the level of the related party transaction, and with the increase of the degree of separation of the two rights, the related party transaction of the ultimate controller increases gradually.And when the separation degree of ultimate control rights is greater, the negative correlation between the performance of listed companies and the scale of related party transactions is strengthened.The empirical results show that with the increase of the level of related party transactions, the level of earnings per share decreases, and there is a significant negative correlation between the two, and in the case of higher cash flow rights of the ultimate controller,The positive correlation between the level of related transaction and the degree of separation of two rights has been weakened.4) it is found that the degree of equity balance can restrict the behavior of the ultimate controller in related party transactions, and thus reduce the behavior of the ultimate controller in encroaching on other shareholders.Therefore, listed companies should introduce more institutional investors or large shareholders to effectively balance the ultimate controller, and ultimately improve corporate performance.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.5;F224

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