阳光私募基金激励机制探究

发布时间：2018-04-15 05:18

本文选题：阳光私募基金 + 契约理论　；参考：《兰州大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：由于阳光私募基金管理人拥有较为集中的基金管理权力和较少的信息披露义务,所以在阳光私募基金行业中,拥有信息优势的基金管理人会在追求自身利益最大化的情况下偏离投资人目标,与投资人形成激励冲突。激励冲突依发生在投资人与管理人签约前后而分为“逆向选择”与“道德风险”。在现代经济学中,研究这两类激励冲突问题主要考虑契约理论,即信息不对称下,委托人通过对签约契约进行设计,以构建一种激励机制,从而避免代理人可能的对委托人目标的偏离。同时,目前我国阳光私募基金产品主要分为“结构化”与“非结构化”两种,这两种私募基金产品正是因收益分配机制设置的不同,形成了两套相异的契约设计。本文通过结合契约理论的相关研究成果,利用数理模型,分别从“逆向选择”与“道德风险”两个角度,比较与剖析两类阳光私募基金产品契约设计中的激励机理,并推导出具体的契约激励特征。进一步的,利用契约理论和获得的相应结论,为我国阳光私募基金激励机制的优化提供参考建议。
[Abstract]:Because sunshine private equity managers have more centralized fund management powers and less disclosure obligations, so in the sunshine private equity fund industry,Fund managers with information advantages will deviate from investors' goals in the pursuit of maximizing their own interests and form incentive conflicts with investors.Incentive conflict is divided into adverse selection and moral hazard according to the investor and manager before and after signing the contract.In modern economics, the study of these two kinds of incentive conflicts mainly considers the contract theory, that is, under the asymmetric information, the client designs the contract to construct an incentive mechanism.In order to avoid the agent may deviate from the principal target.At the same time, at present, the products of sunshine private equity fund in China are mainly divided into two kinds: structured and unstructured. These two kinds of private equity fund products form two sets of different contract designs because of the difference of income distribution mechanism.By combining the relevant research results of contract theory and mathematical model, this paper compares and analyzes the incentive mechanism in the product contract design of two kinds of sunshine private equity funds from the angles of "adverse selection" and "moral hazard", respectively.The specific characteristics of contract incentive are deduced.Furthermore, by using the contract theory and the corresponding conclusions, this paper provides some suggestions for the optimization of the incentive mechanism of the sunshine private equity fund in China.
【学位授予单位】：兰州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51

【参考文献】