保障性住房委托代理关系研究

发布时间：2018-04-17 13:00

本文选题：保障性住房 + 地方政府　；参考：《沈阳建筑大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：建设保障性住房是我国完善保障体系的重要一步,也是满足中低收入家庭住房需求的重要手段。然而,近年来在保障性住房建设的实施过程中问题百出,而其中契约本身的问题是保障性住房委托代理产生诸多问题的根本原因。本文就是基于此,依托于委托代理理论的框架进行分析,对保障性住房建设委托代理过程中地方政府与房地产商这两个实施参与主体构成一个委托代理关系及问题进行了分析,以找到契约设计本身问题出现的原因,并提出来了完善保障性住房建设契约的建议。保障性住房的委托代理关系中信息状态往往是不对称的,代理人是占有信息优势或者拥有私人信息的,委托人则是信息劣势或者不拥有私人信息的。从保障性住房委托代理关系中的参与者来看,地方政府即是委托人,实际实施的房地产开发企业即是代理人。在本论文的第四章中专门研究了对称信息条件下的保障性住房委托代理模型,它的目的是通过分析在对称信息条件的委托代理关系,作为参照,研究不对称信息的委托代理关系。对称信息条件下的保障性住房委托代理模型中,讨论了委托代理模型所涉及到的相关函数的特性、保留效用及确定房地产开发企业的经营管理效率。在委托代理关系中,逆向选择是在信息不对称的情况下讨论的。企业的资金投入水平与企业的努力程度决定了代理人的建设效率。在逆向选择的过程中,假如在代理人的资金投入水平上存在信息不对称,那么委托人在设计契约时无法知道代理人的资金投入水平,代理人却很清楚,在这种情况下,代理人愿意接受委托人设计的契约,也可以实现自身的效用最大化。这既是逆向选择的本质。在论文的第五章,重点研究逆向选择、信息租金、帕累托有效次优解的委托代理模型。首先,本文在分析保障性住房的发展历程及现状的基础上,研究了我国保障性住房建设实施过程的主要问题。其次,依托于委托代理理论分析了保障性住房的委托建设过程中地方政府与房地产开发企业之间的委托代理关系形成的条件。然后,采用博弈的分析方法,通过对保障性住房建设进行委托过程当中地方政府与房地产开发企业的契约委托代理关系模型的构建,探寻这层委托代理关系中出现的问题,以此来探讨我国保障性住房委托契约设计本身的问题。最后,通过总结归纳,为我国保障性住房委托代理的顺利实施提出相关的建议与意见。本论文在契约理论、委托代理理论、博弈论的基础上,将系统理论、经济理论、、管理理论作为指导,通过应用数学建模及系统优化等技术方法,研究不对称信息条件下的保障性住房委托代理模型,针对保障性住房的建设作为研究对象,得到有价值的成果。本文在总体上遵循“提出问题—分析问题—解决问题”的基本思路。在提出问题中,主要提出了政府及房地产开发企业在保障性住房建设当中的地位及作用。在分析问题中,主要是从房地产企业参与保障性住房建设的现状出发,分析了保障性住房建设中政府与房地产开发企业的契约委托代理关系。在解决问题中,针对前面所分析的结论提出了保障性住房委托代理的具体对策建议。
[Abstract]:The construction of affordable housing is an important step to improve the security system of our country, but also an important means to meet the housing needs of low-income families. However, many problems in the implementation of affordable housing construction in recent years, and the contract itself is the problem of affordable housing agency causes many problems. This paper is based on this analysis framework based on principal-agent theory, the construction of affordable housing commissioned by the local government in the process of acting with the real estate business of the two participants in the implementation of a principal-agent relationship and analyzes the problems and reasons in order to find the contract design itself, and put forward the improvement of affordable housing construction contract proposal.
Security agency relationship of housing in the state information is asymmetric, the agent is information advantages or have private information, the client is inferior or don't have private information. From the affordable housing in the principal-agent relationship of participants, the local government is the principal, the actual implementation of the real estate development the enterprise is the agent. In the fourth chapter of this thesis is devoted to study of the affordable housing of the principal-agent model under asymmetric information, its purpose is through the analysis of the principal-agent relationship, in the condition of asymmetric information as a reference, the principal-agent relationship of asymmetric information. Under symmetric information principal-agent model of affordable housing in the characteristics of correlation function of principal-agent model involves the discussion of the reservation utility and determine the real estate development enterprise management committee in efficiency. In the principal-agent relationship, adverse selection is discussed in the case of asymmetric information. The efforts of enterprises capital investment level and the enterprise determines the agent construction efficiency. In adverse selection, if the existence of information asymmetry in the agent funding level, then the principal agent cannot know the funding level in the the design of the contract, the agent is very clear, in this case, the agent is willing to accept the design of principal contract, also can maximize their utility. This is the essence of adverse selection. In the fifth chapter, focuses on the adverse selection, information rent, principal-agent model Pareto efficient suboptimal solutions.
First of all, based on the analysis of security development history and current situation of housing on the main problems of China's affordable housing construction process. Secondly, based on the analysis of the local government commissioned the construction process of housing security and the real estate agency relationship between enterprise formation conditions in principal-agent theory then, using the method of game, the affordable housing construction process commissioned by the local government and real estate development enterprise contract principal-agent model is constructed to explore the principal-agent relationship problems, in order to explore the Housing Commission Contract Design of security in China. Finally, through the summary, for China's affordable housing agency for the smooth implementation of relevant suggestions and opinions.
Based on the contract theory, the principal-agent theory, based on game theory, system theory, economic theory, management theory as the guide, through the application of mathematical modeling and system optimization techniques, the affordable housing agency model of asymmetric information under the conditions for the construction of affordable housing as the research object. Get valuable results.
This paper follows the basic idea of "raise problems, analyze problems and solve problems" in general. In some cases, and mainly presents the role of the government and the real estate development enterprises in the construction of affordable housing status. In the analysis of issues, mainly is the present situation and affordable housing construction in real estate enterprises analysis of the government, affordable housing construction and real estate development enterprises in the contract principal-agent relationship. To solve the problem, the analysis for the above conclusion put forward specific countermeasures and suggestions of the housing security agency.

【学位授予单位】：沈阳建筑大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F299.23

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