高管人才市场治理与公司创新活动

发布时间：2018-05-02 18:00

本文选题：高管人才市场 + 创新活动　；参考：《研究与发展管理》2014年06期

【摘要】：外部高管人才市场对创新活动中代理问题的治理具有独特的优势.本文使用手工收集的2007—2011年中国A股上市公司的创新活动数据进行考察,研究发现:1外部高管人才市场供给在促进公司创新活动投入的同时可以提高公司的创新活动产出;2当公司聘请外部高管倾向处于较低水平时,提高外聘倾向可以促进公司增加创新活动投入和创新活动产出,而且在外部高管人才供给较高时提高外聘倾向对公司创新活动的促进作用更强;3当公司聘请外部高管倾向处于较高水平时,继续提高外聘倾向反而会降低创新活动投入、减少创新活动产出,而且在外部高管人才供给较高时提高外聘倾向对公司创新活动的削弱作用更强.本文结论有助于深入理解外部高管人才市场对公司创新活动相关代理问题的治理作用.
[Abstract]:The external executive talent market has the unique superiority to the management of the agency problem in the innovation activity. This paper investigates the innovation activities of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2011 by using the data collected by hand. The study found that the outside executive market supply of 1 can promote the input of innovation activities and increase the output of innovation activities of the company. 2 when the company tends to employ external executives at a lower level, Increased external orientation can encourage firms to increase inputs and outputs for innovation activities, Moreover, when the supply of external executives is high, increasing the external propensity to promote the innovation activities of the company is stronger. When the company tends to employ external executives at a higher level, increasing the external tendency will reduce the investment in innovation activities. Reducing the output of innovation activities and increasing the external propensity to increase the external propensity of external executives will weaken the innovation activities of the company more strongly. The conclusion of this paper is helpful to understand the governance effect of external executive talent market on agency problems related to innovation activities.
【作者单位】：内蒙古大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目“资本市场治理功能对矿产行业整合及其经济后果的影响研究”(71263034) 教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目“终极股东特征;社会责任活动与公司绩效研究”(10XJC630003) 内蒙古大学高层次人才引进科研启动项目“公司研发投入会计确认与投资者保护研究”(Z20100103)
【分类号】：C964.21;F832.51;F271

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