独立董事的独立性影响因素及治理效果研究——基于董事会投票的证据

发布时间：2018-05-02 17:21

本文选题：董事会独立性 + 董事会投票　；参考：《科学决策》2014年01期

【摘要】：论文考察了中国上市公司中独立董事相对于公司管理层独立性的影响因素及独立董事的实际治理效果。采用中国独有的强制披露的独立董事对董事会议案投票的数据进行研究,解决了以往研究中的内生性问题。研究发现,独立董事在绝大多数情况下并不会对董事会议案提出公开质疑,然而当公司业绩较差时,独立董事更有可能质疑公司管理层的行为。进一步研究发现,存在异议独董的公司股票收益率在之后两年内会有更加明显的提升,并且存在异议独董的公司正向盈余管理的水平明显低于无异议独董的公司。这表明当公司经营状况不佳时,独立董事自身的监督作用能够得到充分的发挥和体现,并且其监督行为能够提高公司价值和公司的会计透明度。由此可知独立董事制度的设立确实能够对中国的上市公司产生一定的治理效果,具有较为积极的意义。
[Abstract]:This paper examines the influence factors of independent directors relative to the management independence of listed companies in China and the actual governance effect of independent directors. This paper studies the data of the board of directors voting by the independent director, which is unique to China, and solves the problem of endogeneity in the previous research. The study found that independent directors do not publicly question board motions in most cases, but when companies perform poorly, independent directors are more likely to question the behaviour of the company's management. Further study shows that the stock yield of the company with dissenting director will increase more obviously in the next two years, and the level of positive earnings management of the company with dissenting director is obviously lower than that of the company without dissent. This shows that when the company is in a bad state of operation, the independent director's own supervisory role can be fully played and reflected, and its supervisory behavior can improve the company's value and the accounting transparency of the company. It can be seen that the establishment of independent director system can produce certain governance effect for listed companies in China, which has more positive significance.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学财政金融学院;北京大学光华管理学院;天津财经大学珠江学院;
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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