治理环境、家族控制和现金股利

发布时间：2018-05-24 23:17

本文选题：治理环境 + 两权分离度　；参考：《华东理工大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：近些年来,家族企业在上市公司中的比例逐渐增多,但是家族企业的掏空案例也在增多。控股股东和中小股东的利益冲突,导致隧道效应的产生,现金股利的发放的减少,一定程度上损害了中小股东的利益。使得越来越多的研究者开始关注家族企业股权中中小股东的利益。以往的研究大多关注家族公司内部治理,而忽略了外部环境治理环境同样会对现金股利产生影响。本文以代理理论为理论基础,首先以家族企业的控股权与现金流量权分离、是否是创始型家族企业两方面作为代理变量,来验证家族控制对现金股利支付意愿和支付率的影响。然后通过对治理环境高低分组回归分析对比,以及加入交叉乘项回归分析,检验在较好的治理环境下,是否会减少家族控制对现金股利的影响。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the proportion of family firms in listed companies has gradually increased, but the number of tunneling cases is also increasing. The conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders leads to the generation of tunnel effect and the reduction of cash dividend, which to some extent damages the interests of minority shareholders. So that more and more researchers begin to pay attention to the interests of minority shareholders in family enterprises. Previous studies have mostly focused on the internal governance of family companies, while ignoring that the external environmental governance environment will also have an impact on cash dividends. On the basis of agency theory, this paper firstly uses the separation of controlling right and cash flow right of family business as agency variables to verify the influence of family control on cash dividend payment will and payment rate. Then, by comparing the high and low group regression analysis of governance environment and adding cross multiplicative item regression analysis, this paper tests whether the family control will reduce the influence on cash dividend under the better governance environment.
【学位授予单位】：华东理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F276.5;F832.51

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