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城市商业房地产市场主体之间的利益均衡博弈研究

发布时间:2018-05-29 11:42

  本文选题:城市 + 商业房地产 ; 参考:《吉林大学》2013年博士论文


【摘要】:中国商业房地产业的发展相对滞后,回顾20多年的发展及现状,既可以揭示中国商业房地产发展的轨迹,也可以发掘中国商业房地产业潜在的巨大机会。 商业地产表面繁荣的背后是规划无序、生态破坏、经营混乱等一系列问题,这让越来越多的经济学者对未来充满忧虑。 商业房地产市场的不均衡发展是常态,研究我国商业房地产市场理论现状及其市场所暴露的问题,既有其理论层面的意义,也有现实意义。 商业房地产市场参与各方既具有一定的独立性,又相互依存、相互影响;市场中的每一方都有各自的利益,而其利益的兑现却取决于相关各方的承诺与选择。毫无疑问,博弈论特别适合于对商业房地产市场的平衡分析并对制度设计与选择提供支持与帮助。 商业房地产的发展可以带动一个城市甚至一个区域的经济发展,这是城市化进程中重要的推动力量。商业房地产的开发投资额度巨大,影响广泛,一个城市的商业发达程度直接影响着这个城市的经济发展水平。 商业房地产市场中,利益相关者一般是指参与商业房地产市场并对其产生影响的每一个群体,他们是房地产市场的重要构成要素。概括而言,主要包括政府(中央政府和地方政府)、商业房地产开发商、零售商三个主体。 本文第四章围绕开发商行为与政府职能展开论述。重点针对监管问题展开。在商业房地产市场中,政府一方面扮演土地提供方的角色,同时也是市场规则的制定者与裁判员(由不同政府部门执行)。为了探究商业房地产开发过程中市场失衡的根本原因,我们应当考虑这些行为主体的利益,并认为他们的选择是利益博弈的结果。 本文第五章介绍了开发商作为市场中最重要的主体,开发商与开发商之间也存在着博弈关系。最突出的问题就是,,面对市场利益,房地产企业面临两难选择,价格竞争或者合谋。商业房地产市场竞争的激烈程度与企业的盈利能力负相关,因此,企业有强烈的动机通过合谋来弱化竞争,以获取利润最大化。房地产市场独特的市场结构使得房地产企业间的合谋不仅成为可能,而且具有相当的稳定性。 本文第六章讨论的是在开发商与零售商相互选择的过程,开发商与零售商在商业房地产市场中如何建立彼此的信任?在交易合作过程中如何降低交易成本?本章节引入了博弈论中的声誉模型进行详尽的分析。在这一市场中,企业的行为正如我们所知道的那样,声誉的本质在于可以使行为人获取长期的收益。 本文第七章为案例研究,结合长春市房地产市场及ZD集团的成功展开论述。 博弈论的核心是分析均衡。从商业房地产市场的供给、需求以及价格形成的过程来看,这个市场是非常典型的带有博弈特征的竞争性业务活动的。商业房地产市场发展是为了满足城市各种活动对空间的需求而进行的土地开发过程,这一过程中,具有不同利益和目的的政府、开发商、零售商,作为最重要的主体构成,其相互间的利益分配关系直接影响着市场的均衡发展。 商业房地产的可持续发展,不仅有利于国家监督商业房地产企业的经营行为,也能够对于确立房地产企业发展的自律机制和竞争机制提供有效帮助,从而促进房地产行业的健康发展,这对国家资源的合理配置,保证零售商的利益,协助政府相关部门制定决策并确保这一市场良性循环具有重要的意义
[Abstract]:The development of China's commercial real estate industry is lagging behind. Reviewing the development and current situation of more than 20 years, it can not only reveal the development track of Chinese commercial real estate, but also discover the potential great opportunities for Chinese commercial real estate industry.
Behind the prosperity of commercial real estate is a series of problems, such as planning disorder, ecological destruction, and operation confusion, which makes more and more economists worry about the future.
The unbalanced development of the commercial real estate market is normal. It is of both theoretical and practical significance to study the current situation of the commercial real estate market and the problems exposed in the market.
The participation of all parties in the commercial real estate market has a certain independence, interdependence and mutual influence; each party in the market has its own interests, and the cashing of its interests depends on the commitment and choice of the relevant parties. No doubt, game theory is especially suitable for the equilibrium analysis of the commercial real estate market and the design and selection of the system. Provide support and help.
The development of commercial real estate can drive the economic development of a city or even a region. It is an important driving force in the process of urbanization. The amount of investment in the development of commercial real estate is huge and its influence is widespread. The degree of commercial development of a city directly affects the economic development level of this city.
In the commercial real estate market, the stakeholders generally refer to each group participating in the commercial real estate market and affecting it. They are the important elements of the real estate market. In general, it mainly includes the government (the central government and the local government), the commercial real estate developer, and the retailer's three main bodies.
The fourth chapter focuses on the behavior of developers and government functions. In the commercial real estate market, the government plays the role of the land supplier on the one hand, and is also the maker of the market rules and the referee (carried out by different government departments). In order to explore the market loss in the process of commercial real estate development, the market is lost. The fundamental reason for balance is that we should consider the interests of these actors and think that their choice is the result of interest game.
The fifth chapter introduces the developer as the most important subject in the market, and there is a game relationship between the developer and the developer. The most prominent problem is that the real estate enterprises face the dilemma, price competition or conspiracy in the face of market interests. The fierce competition in the commercial real estate market is negatively related to the profitability of the enterprises. Therefore, enterprises have strong motivation to weaken the competition through conspiracy in order to maximize profits. The unique market structure of the real estate market makes the conspiracy between real estate enterprises not only possible, but also has considerable stability.
The sixth chapter discusses the process of mutual choice between developers and retailers. How do developers and retailers establish mutual trust in the commercial real estate market? How to reduce transaction costs in the process of trading cooperation? This chapter introduces the reputation model in the game theory for detailed analysis. In this market, the behavior of the enterprise As we all know, the essence of reputation is to enable actors to gain long-term benefits.
The seventh chapter is a case study, which is based on the success of Changchun real estate market and ZD group.
The core of the game theory is the analysis of equilibrium. From the perspective of the supply, demand and price formation of the commercial real estate market, this market is a very typical competitive business with game characteristics. The development of the commercial real estate market is to meet the needs of the various activities of the city in the land development process. In the process, the government, developers and retailers, with different interests and purposes, constitute the most important subject, and their mutual benefit distribution has a direct impact on the balanced development of the market.
The sustainable development of commercial real estate not only helps the state to supervise the business behavior of the commercial real estate enterprises, but also can provide effective help to establish the self-discipline mechanism and competition mechanism of the development of the real estate enterprise, thus promoting the healthy development of the real estate industry, the rational allocation of the national resources, the guarantee of the interests of the retailers, and the assistance of the retailers. It is of great significance for the relevant government departments to make policy decisions and ensure the virtuous circle of the market.
【学位授予单位】:吉林大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F299.233.4;F224.32

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