财政分权、晋升竞争与保障房供给——基于江苏县级面板数据的实证分析

发布时间：2018-05-29 15:18

本文选题：晋升竞争 + 财政分权　；参考：《理论月刊》2014年06期

【摘要】：目前,无论相对于政府的最大供给能力,还是相对于保障房需求量而言,我国保障房供给量均为不足。因此,保障房供给不足的根源及对策研究显得十分必要。县级政府是提供保障房的职责主体,然而,在现行财政分权与政府治理架构下,提供保障房无法给县级政府带来地方财政收入的增加与地方官员晋升竞争力的提升,因而地方政府缺乏保障房供给激励。本文理论分析并利用江苏县级层面数据实证检验财政分权、地方官员晋升竞争对保障房供给的影响。研究结果表明,地方官员晋升竞争是保障房供给不足的主要根源;财政分权总体上对保障房供给产生负向影响,但区域差异较大。因此,增加保障房供给,需要改革目前政府治理架构,完善财政分权体制。
[Abstract]:At present, the supply of indemnificatory apartment in our country is insufficient, not only relative to the maximum supply capacity of the government, but also to the demand of indemnificatory apartment. Therefore, it is necessary to study the root causes and countermeasures of insufficient supply of indemnificatory apartment. The county government is the main responsibility of providing indemnificatory apartment. However, under the current structure of fiscal decentralization and government governance, the provision of indemnificatory apartment can not bring about the increase of local fiscal revenue and the promotion of competitiveness of local officials. As a result, local governments lack indemnificatory apartment supply incentives. This paper theoretically analyzes and uses Jiangsu county-level data to test the effect of fiscal decentralization and competition for promotion of local officials on the supply of indemnificatory apartment. The results show that the competition for promotion of local officials is the main source of insufficient supply of indemnificatory apartment, and the fiscal decentralization has a negative effect on the supply of indemnificatory apartment in general, but there are great regional differences. Therefore, to increase the supply of indemnificatory apartment, we need to reform the current government governance structure and improve the fiscal decentralization system.
【作者单位】：南京审计学院经济学院;南京大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金青年项目(13CJY038) 江苏省教育厅人文社科基金一般项目(2013SJD790014) 江苏省博士后科研基金项目(1301008C)
【分类号】：F299.23

【参考文献】