中国上市公司控制权计算与分析

发布时间：2018-06-17 22:51

本文选题：控制权 + 概率投票模型　；参考：《山东大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文以张小茜和汪炜(2008)概率投票模型为理论基础,采用我国上市公司样本,计算并分析了普通决议机制和特殊决议机制下的控制权和有效控制份额,并以股权分置改革为背景对我国公司控制权安排的变化进行了深入考察。改善我国的资本市场,保护中小投资者利益是股权分置改革的主要目标,本文从控制权变化角度和控制权与现金流权分离的角度探索了股权分置改革的目前的成效。文章的研究主线首先应用张小茜和汪炜(2008)概率投票模型对选定样本期间上市公司第一大股东的控制权进行计算,然后统计分析样本期间控制权及有效控制份额的特点。分析发现控制权在样本年间比较稳定,而且最大股东的变更与上市公司控制权有显著负向关系：控制权越小的控股股东样本期内越容易发生股东的更替；样本期间我国上市公司的最大股东的持股比例大于有效控制份额(普通决议机制0.99对应)的次数占比60%-70%，，显示出我国上市公司股权高度集中的特点；然后选择了股权变更频繁的上市公司深国商为例子对其公司股权安排进行了剖析,得到我们计算的控制权值在公司股权变更中的重要作用。然后文章分析了股权分置改革前后控制权的变化,并从大股东控制权与现金流权分离的角度验证了股改前后大股东“渠道效应”的变化,文章发现尽管第一大股东的持股比例在股改之后显著下降,但是并没有有效抑制大股东的“渠道效应”。最后文章对所选参数进行了稳健性检验,发现参数的选择不会动摇文章的结论。资本市场不完善是制约我国企业发展的瓶颈,而投资者保护尤其是中小投资者利益的保护又是资本市场发展的瓶颈。控制权牢牢控制在第一大股东手中是一把双刃剑,虽然会维护公司的稳定性但也造成有的公司控制权高度集中损害中小股东的利益。我们的研究为评价股权分置改革在改善中小股东利益和资本市场发展方而提供了依据,同时有关政策部门可以借鉴文章的结论考虑使用立法或者行政规定来压制控股股东在重大事项中的控制权,避免其他股东在股东会中可有可无的作用,保护中小股东的利益和话语权。另外本文的研究也证实了股东持股比例和控制度是对控制权不同的度量标准,公司或者有关部门叮以从控制度的角度在公司章程或者规定中制定相应条款在限制第一大股东过大的控制权,而不仅仅从持股比例上规定；因为通过一定的股权安排持股比例小可以控制公司。当然文章的结论也可以给公司控股股东提供股权预警信号和股权安排启发。
[Abstract]:Based on the probabilistic voting model of Zhang Xiaoxi and Wang Wei (2008), using the sample of listed companies in China, this paper calculates and analyzes the control rights and effective control shares under the ordinary resolution mechanism and the special resolution mechanism. And with the background of split share structure reform, the change of corporate control arrangement in China is investigated. To improve the capital market and protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors is the main goal of the split share structure reform. This paper explores the current results of the reform from the perspective of the change of control rights and the separation of control and cash flow rights. The main line of this paper is to use the probabilistic voting model of Zhang Xiaoxi and Wang Wei Xi 2008 to calculate the control rights of the largest shareholders of the listed company during the selected sample period, and then to analyze the characteristics of the control rights and effective control shares during the sample period. It is found that the control rights are relatively stable in the sample years, and the change of the largest shareholders has a significant negative relationship with the control rights of listed companies: the smaller the control rights are, the more likely is the replacement of shareholders in the sample period of the controlling shareholders; During the sample period, the proportion of the largest shareholders of the listed companies in our country is larger than the effective control share (corresponding to 0.99 of the ordinary resolution mechanism), which shows the characteristics of the high concentration of the stock rights of the listed companies in our country. Then we choose Shenzhen BCCHK, a listed company with frequent stock rights change, as an example to analyze its equity arrangement, and get the important role of our calculated control value in the stock right change. Then the paper analyzes the change of control right before and after the reform of split share structure, and verifies the change of "channel effect" of large shareholder before and after the reform from the angle of separation of control right and cash flow right of large shareholder. The paper finds that although the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder decreases significantly after the stock reform, it does not effectively restrain the "channel effect" of the major shareholder. Finally, the paper tests the robustness of the selected parameters and finds that the selection of the parameters will not waver the conclusion of the article. The imperfect capital market is the bottleneck restricting the development of Chinese enterprises, and the protection of investors' interests, especially the protection of the interests of small and medium-sized investors, is the bottleneck of the development of the capital market. Controlling power firmly in the hands of the largest shareholder is a double-edged sword, although it will maintain the stability of the company, but also cause some company control rights highly concentrated damage to the interests of minority shareholders. Our research provides a basis for evaluating the interests of minority shareholders and the development of the capital market. At the same time, the relevant policy departments can draw lessons from the conclusions of the article to consider using legislation or administrative regulations to suppress the controlling rights of controlling shareholders in major matters, so as to avoid the unnecessary role of other shareholders in shareholders' meetings. To protect the interests and voice rights of minority shareholders. In addition, the research of this paper also proves that the shareholding ratio and the degree of control are different measures of the control right. The company or the relevant department makes the corresponding clause in the articles of association or the stipulation from the angle of the degree of control in order to limit the control right of the largest shareholder, not only from the shareholding ratio; Because through a certain shareholding arrangement of small proportion can control the company. Of course, the conclusion of the article can also provide stock warning signal and equity arrangement inspiration to the controlling shareholders of the company.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F279.23;F832.51

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