我国A股上市公司CEO薪酬“幸运支付”实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-28 20:46

本文选题：CEO薪酬 + 公司业绩　；参考：《复旦大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：自CEO薪酬改革实行以来,上市公司尤其是国有控股上市公司CEO高薪现象引起了学术界和业界的多方讨论,但没有统一的结论。近年来不受高管控制但会影响公司业绩的外部经济环境、行业政策等客观因素在高管薪酬决定机制中的作用逐渐引起学者的关注,并提出了“幸运支付”概念,从一个新的角度挖掘高管薪酬制订的内在规律。以“幸运支付”为突破口,研究客观因素在我国高管薪酬制订中所起的作用,具有重要的现实意义和理论价值。在系统梳理现有文献的基础上,本文以“幸运支付假说”为依托,结合我国独特的转型经济背景,研究“幸运”因素对我国CEO薪酬的影响。首先,为直观地体现CEO薪酬制订中“幸运”业绩的作用,本文以案例分析的形式从定性和定量两个方面研究了火力发电行业CEO薪酬的“幸运”支付。接着,本文将研究对象进一步扩大至所有行业,采用二阶段回归(2sls)对全行业下CEO薪酬的“幸运支付”进行了实证研究。同时,考虑到国有企业有别于私营企业的虚拟代理人、行政垄断等特征,企业性质可能对“幸运”支付现象的程度产生影响。为此,本文又区分了企业性质,进一步考察国有控股上市公司CEO薪酬“幸运”支付现象与私营上市公司是否存在显著的不同。通过火电行业的案例分析及进一步对我国A股市场所有行业1608家公司共8159个年份-薪酬非平衡数据的考察发现：(1)我国上市公司CEO薪酬存在显著的“幸运支付”现象,这与国际上的研究结论相同,支持了“幸运”支付假说；(2)无论是会计业绩还是市场业绩,CEO薪酬对“幸运业绩”的敏感性与其对传统的公司业绩的敏感性相同,当会计业绩指标替换时前者甚至超过了后者：(3)在区分企业性质的情形下,对同样增幅的“幸运”业绩,国有控股上市公司CEO的薪酬涨幅远远高于非国有控股上市公司CEO,国有控股上市公司高管薪酬制定中存在更为严重的“幸运”支付现象。依据委托－代理理论,将CEO薪酬与不受CEO控制的公司业绩挂钩实质是股东的风险转嫁行为。风险厌恶的CEO在面临更大风险时会要求股东给予更多的补偿。这样的制度设置也有可能激励CEO冒险预测“幸运”因素的走向,使企业面临更多的风险。我国企业尤其是国有企业CEO薪酬的“幸运支付”现象为国有企业CEO薪酬激励机制的进一步改革提供了政策依据。在未来,CEO薪酬激励机制应更加完善以努力区分CEO的真实努力和“幸运”业绩部分,避免企‘业承担不必要的风险。
[Abstract]:Since the implementation of CEO compensation reform, the phenomenon of high CEO salary in listed companies, especially in state-owned holding listed companies, has caused many discussions in academia and industry, but there is no uniform conclusion. In recent years, the external economic environment which is not controlled by senior executives but will affect the performance of the company, the role of objective factors such as industry policy in the executive compensation decision mechanism has gradually attracted the attention of scholars, and put forward the concept of "lucky payment". From a new perspective to explore the executive compensation formulation of the internal law. Taking "lucky payment" as the breakthrough point, it is of great practical significance and theoretical value to study the role of objective factors in the formulation of executive compensation in China. On the basis of systematically combing the existing literature, this paper studies the influence of "lucky" factors on CEO compensation in China on the basis of "Lucky payment hypothesis" and combined with our country's unique transition economic background. Firstly, in order to intuitively reflect the role of "lucky" performance in CEO compensation making, this paper studies the "lucky" payment of CEO compensation in thermal power industry from qualitative and quantitative aspects in the form of case study. Then, this paper extends the research object to all industries, and makes an empirical study on the "lucky payment" of CEO compensation in the whole industry by using two-stage regression (2sls). At the same time, considering the characteristics of virtual agent and administrative monopoly of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, the nature of enterprises may have an impact on the degree of "lucky" payment. Therefore, this paper also distinguishes the nature of the enterprise, and further studies whether there is a significant difference between the "lucky" payment of CEO compensation of the state-owned holding listed company and that of the private listed company. Through the case analysis of thermal power industry and the further investigation of 1608 companies in all industries in A-share market in China, the results show that: (1) there is a significant "lucky payment" phenomenon in CEO compensation of listed companies in China. This is consistent with international studies and supports the "lucky" payment hypothesis. (2) both accounting performance and market performance CEO compensation are as sensitive to "lucky performance" as they are to traditional corporate performance. When the accounting performance indicators are replaced, the former even outperforms the latter: (3) for the "lucky" performance of the same increase in the nature of the enterprise, The pay increase for CEOs of state-owned listed companies is far higher than that for non-state-owned listed companies, and there is a more serious phenomenon of "lucky" payment in the development of executive compensation for state-owned listed companies. According to the principal-agent theory, linking the CEO compensation to the performance of the company that is not controlled by the CEO is essentially the risk transfer behavior of the shareholders. Risk-averse CEOs demand more compensation from shareholders when faced with greater risk. Such a system may also encourage CEOs to take risks and predict the direction of "lucky" factors, making companies more exposed to risks. The phenomenon of "lucky payment" of CEO compensation in Chinese enterprises, especially in state-owned enterprises, provides a policy basis for the further reform of CEO compensation incentive mechanism in state-owned enterprises. In the future, CEO compensation incentives should be improved to distinguish between CEO's real effort and "lucky" performance, and avoid unnecessary risks to the industry.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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